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ABSTRACT: Several recent films have villainized the health-insurance 
industry as a central element of their plots. This Article examines three 
of those films: Critical Care, The Rainmaker, and John Q. It analyzes these 
films through the context of the consumer backlash against managed 
care that began in the 1990s and shows how these films reflect the con-
sumer sentiment regarding health-insurance companies and the cost 
controlling strategies they employ. In addition, the Article identifies 
three key premises about health insurance in the films that, although 
exaggerated and incomplete, have significant factual support. Ulti-
mately, the author argues that, despite their passionately critical and 
liberal tone, these films actually put forward solutions that are highly 
individualist and conservative, rather than inclusive and systemic. 
There’s nothing more thrilling than nailing an insurance 
company!
  –Deck Shifflet, The Rainmaker1 
Hollywood has a new villain—the private health-insur- ance system. Viewers of the 1997 film As Good As it Gets  probably remember the profane outburst of Helen Hunt’s 
character describing her private insurance coverage—a health 
maintenance organization (HMO)2 —and its failure to provide 
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appropriate medical treatment for her sick child.3  One probably 
also remembers that the audience cheered.4  The scene, viewed by 
millions,5  attracted an extraordinary amount of attention. Even 
President Clinton referred to the scene in a speech presenting 
the Patient’s Bill of Rights in 1998, joking that the film is “going 
to be disqualified for an Academy Award because it’s too close to 
real life.”6  
Three additional films show that the tremendous audience response 
to this scene was not a fluke. They signal a new and unexplored fo-
cus on private health insurance,7  now dominated by managed care 
and its relationship to healthcare, in contemporary mainstream 
films. Sidney Lumet’s Critical Care,8  Francis Ford Coppola’s The 
Rainmaker,9  and Nick Cassavetes’s John Q10  each center on negative 
and disturbing images of modern insurance companies from the 
perspective of a doctor, a lawyer, and a parent. Each portrays the in-
ner workings of these companies and the victimization of patients 
and their families as a result of insurer policies and practices. The 
narratives also reflect common public perceptions about private 
health insurance, such as: the link between lack of coverage and 
lack of access to care, including life-saving care; the perverse and 
distorting effect of certain managed care reimbursement arrange-
ments on treatment decisions; and the loss of adequate health 
coverage for workers and their families. 
As Good As it Gets, Critical Care, and The Rainmaker were released in 
1997.11  John Q, the most sensational of the films, appeared five years 
later in 2002.12  Prior to these films, no mainstream film villainized 
the health-insurance industry as a central element of the plot. Why 
did private health insurers emerge as villains in popular films in the 
late 1990s? Each of these films offers a sharp critique of the current 
state of health insurance and its relationship to healthcare; but is 
the system really failing in the ways these films suggest? If so, what 
can we learn from the solutions these films offer? 
To answer those questions, Part I of this Article identifies the vivid 
and overwhelmingly negative images of modern health-insurance 
companies within each film. Part II examines the films within the 
context of the powerful consumer backlash against managed care 
in the 1990s. It shows that the intensity and emotional power of 
the images accurately reflect the public’s dismal opinion of health-
insurance companies and the various strategies they employ. Part 
III identifies three key premises about health insurance in the films 
and demonstrates that, although exaggerated and incomplete, 
the premises have significant factual support. Finally, Part IV con-
tends that, despite their passionately critical and liberal tone, these 
films actually put forward solutions that are highly individualist 
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and conservative, rather than inclusive and systemic. Indeed, 
the resolution of each of the narratives comes about through the 
actions of one individual—one good doctor, one good attorney 
taking one good case, and, most disturbingly, one good father with 
a gun—and resolves the situation of one patient. This “dissolv-
ing critique” effect is significant because it resonates with similar 
shifts in current healthcare policy, evidenced by the turn toward 
consumer-driven health plans.
I. Images of Health Insurance in Recent 
Popular Films
The emergence of private health-insurance companies as villains 
in these three films13  fits within the familiar popular theme of con-
sumer mistrust of powerful, private corporate entities and their 
lawyers. Professor Anthony Chase has described this trend as the 
“characteristic, populist skepticism of law, courts, and people in 
pin-stripe suits.”14  The new, vivid, and overwhelmingly negative 
portrayal of health insurers and their strategies of managed care 
in these three recent films—each featuring well-known directors, 
actors, and movie studios and marketed at the masses—warrants 
attention.15  
A.  Critical Care 
Critical Care, based on Richard Dooling’s novel,16  is a darkly comic 
portrayal of doctors, death, and money in the modern, high-tech-
nology practice of medicine. The film centers on Dr. Werner Ernst, 
an exhausted resident watching over a futuristic and impersonal 
intensive care unit filled with seemingly lifeless patients. The 
unit looks more like the inside of a spaceship than a hospital, a 
stark white space in which the patients seem to float, restrained 
atop translucent blue inflatable beds. The patients are silent and 
anonymous—usually referred to only by bed number—and kept 
alive at great expense by the machines surrounding them. Indeed, 
dehumanization is established as a goal, rather than a by-product, 
of high-tech medicine. Dr. Ernst aspires, at least initially, to join 
Dr. Hofstader’s prestigious lab, where “seeing patients is a waste of 
a doctor’s time” because actual patients have been replaced with 
continuously monitored patient data. The benefits, as one of Dr. 
Hofstader’s protégées proudly explains, are obvious, as “there is 
no longer any condition that is truly terminal. Just patients that 
we chose not to maintain.”17  
Initially, Dr. Ernst appears more interested in the privileges of his 
profession than his patients. Nonetheless, he is drawn into an ethi-
cal quandary over the care of one of his nonresponsive patients, Mr. 
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Potter, and specifically the propriety of a gastronomy procedure 
to keep him alive. Mr. Potter’s daughters, Felicia and Constance, 
disagree on the surgery and continuation of his life support. Each 
daughter appears to be concerned with the best interests of her 
father, but Dr. Ernst learns that Constance controls her father’s $10 
million estate while he lives, and Felicia stands to inherit it when 
he dies. He is drawn into their legal battle when he is seduced by 
Felicia and blackmailed with a videotape of their encounter, dur-
ing which he made professionally damaging statements about her 
father’s condition. 
Along the way, Dr. Ernst is counseled by the cynical Dr. Butz, the 
putative Chairman of Intensive Care Medicine, and the wise and 
compassionate Nurse Stella.18  Dr. Butz is portrayed—to comedic 
effect—as a washed-up and unfit physician, so impaired by alcohol-
ism that he is barely competent to operate his own phone, let alone 
on an actual patient. Dr. Butz repeatedly tries to teach Dr. Ernst 
about the economics of managed care, such as when Dr. Ernst ques-
tions the futility of further invasive treatment for Mr. Potter:
Butz: What’s wrong with Bed 5? He’s all paid up. 
Got three insurance companies paying off his bills 
. . . .
Ernst: If there is no reasonable prospect of cure, 
why should we proceed?
Butz: Where have you been all of your life? It’s 
called revenue. He’s got catastrophic health insur-
ance, long-term health care, the works! . . . If the pa-
tient were part of an HMO then I could understand 
your dilemma. With those babies, we get paid not to 
perform medical procedures. It’s a little like when 
the government pays the farmers not to grow crops. 
However, with insurance we get paid to perform 
medical procedures. Do you understand the differ-
ence? . . . Well, do it. My God! I get a cut of every 
procedure we do on the guy. He’s got catastrophic 
health insurance.19 
Dr. Ernst’s attempt to bring empathy into the decisionmaking 
calculus is met with incredulity: 
Ernst: My question is, if you were comatose, would 
you want to be kept alive for months by machine?
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Butz: Hell no! . . . That’s why I don’t have health 
insurance. . . . Just make sure you don’t have money 
for health care and you’ll die a happy fellow with 
a big smile on your face in your own king-sized 
bed!20 
During another meeting with Dr. Butz regarding the Potter lawsuit, 
Dr. Ernst is paged to the emergency room to treat a nineteen-year- 
old patient with a potentially severe head injury. After confirming 
that the patient has no insurance, Dr. Butz insists that Dr. Ernst 
disregard the page, explaining: 
Butz: He’s 19. He’s got no medical coverage and 
he’s some rowdy kid. What do you think would hap-
pen if I got in my car one Sunday and drove over to 
this kid’s house and said “hey kid, come next door 
and cut my grass and if I ever get any money I’ll pay 
you. Just send me the bill, kid.” What do you think 
would happen?
Ernst: Cutting grass is a little different from emer-
gency medical care. 
Butz: I know that, but it’s still a service economy 
and if you want service in a service economy you 
pay for it. And if you don’t pay for service in a service 
economy you ruin the whole country.21 
Throughout, Mr. Potter shows no signs of awareness except for the 
constant tapping of his finger against the steel bar of his inflatable 
bed. When a member of the intensive care unit (ICU) staff learns 
that Potter was a Navy signalman, he discovers that the tapping 
is a message in Morse Code—“if you love me . . . if you love me . . . 
if you love me.”22  Dr. Ernst does not know what to make of this 
ambiguous communication—if you love me, do what? Echoing 
his prior attempts to approach the dilemma from the standpoint 
of Mr. Potter, a nun appears at Potter’s beside and advises Dr. Ernst 
to “Listen to your heart. Think of this man as your father. Love 
him, comfort him.”23 
At the guardianship hearing in the Potter lawsuit, Dr. Ernst finally 
emerges as an advocate for his patient. He impugns the motivations 
of each of the parties represented at the large table—the grasping 
daughters, the greedy doctors and hospital, and the indistinguish-
able representatives of the insurance companies: 
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I almost forgot about the insurance companies. 
But I don’t really need to say anything about them 
because no one ever believes that an insurance com-
pany cares about anything except getting paid the 
premiums and honoring as few claims as possible. 
I see you don’t object.24  
He then turns on himself:
[I cared] about making money and getting a new car 
and meeting pretty women, becoming a big shot 
doctor, when I should have been concerned and 
should have cared about this patient. My patient. . . .  
The only one missing is the patient. The one with-
out a voice is the patient. And, all of us together are 
the health care system. A system as collapsed and 
comatose and near death as Mr. Potter in Bed 5 in 
the ICU, and we should care. We should care.25  
Ultimately, Dr. Ernst is permitted to work out a settlement where 
the daughters will split the money, release all claims, and give 
power of attorney to Dr. Ernst to make treatment decisions for 
their father.26  He returns to the hospital and turns off Mr. Potter’s 
ventilator. His ethical awakening is underscored by the last scene, 
in which “some rowdy kid” crashes on roller blades in the hospital 
parking lot. Dr. Butz speeds off, admonishing Dr. Ernst to “ask him 
for proof of insurance!” Dr. Ernst rushes to aid the injured kid who 
asks “are you a doctor?” Dr. Ernst answers, “Yeah, I’m a doctor.”27 
B. The Rainmaker
The Rainmaker, based on John Grisham’s novel,28  was released 
shortly after Critical Care in 1997.  It has generated significant atten-
tion in legal scholarship, particularly with respect to its depiction 
of lawyers, the legal system, and legal ethics.29  Considerably less 
attention, however, has been paid to the portrayal of the health- 
insurance industry.30 
Rudy Baylor, an idealistic and inexperienced lawyer who wants 
to “shine the blazing light of justice into every corner,” stumbles 
into a major case against a powerful and corrupt health-insurance 
company, Great Benefit. Baylor’s client, Donny Ray Black, needs a 
life-saving bone marrow transplant for treatment of his leukemia, 
but his claim has been denied eight times and for several differ-
ent reasons, including exclusion of the bone marrow transplant 
as experimental. Great Benefit’s final letter to Mrs. Black states, 
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“[o]n seven prior occasions this company has denied your claim 
in writing. We now deny it for the eighth and final time. You must 
be stupid, stupid, stupid. Sincerely, Everett Lufkin. Vice President, 
Claims Department.”31 
As Baylor meets with the family to prepare the case, he reflects on 
the deterioration of Donny Ray’s health: 
So this is how the uninsured die. In a society filled 
with brilliant doctors and state of the art technol-
ogy, it’s obscene to let this boy just wither away and 
die. He was covered by an insurance policy that his 
mother paid good money for. It wasn’t big money, 
but it was good money. I’m alone in this trial. I’m 
seriously outgunned and I’m scared, but I’m right. 
I sit here with this poor suffering kid and I swear 
revenge.32 
As Donny Ray dies, Baylor struggles to expose Great Benefit’s ac-
tions. Great Benefit’s team of arrogant, high-powered lawyers hides 
crucial information from Baylor, including the whereabouts of the 
claims manager who handled Donny Ray’s claim, Jackie Lemanc-
zyk. Meanwhile, Baylor arranges to have the deposition of Donny 
Ray take place out in the open, in the yard of the Black’s home. At 
trial, Baylor projects Great Benefit’s denial letter on an overhead 
projector for all to see, exposes the denial as experimental to be 
fraudulent using one of Great Benefit’s own internal documents, 
and uncovers the key witness and supporting documents in the 
nick of time. 
In closing arguments, Great Benefit’s attorney warns that find-
ing for the Blacks in this case will cause premiums to spin out of 
control and will pave the way for “government controlled health 
coverage.”33  Baylor counters by projecting the deposition of Donny 
Ray, who died prior to trial, his face floating above the courtroom 
like a ghost. Donny Ray tells the jury that he “had a 90% chance 
of living.”34  Baylor reminds the jury, “if you don’t punish Great 
Benefit, you could be their next victim.”35 
Although Baylor is rewarded with a stunning victory at the end of 
trial—$150,000 in compensatory and $50 million in punitive dam-
ages—Donny Ray has died and Great Benefit’s executives loot and 
bankrupt the company. In the words of Great Benefit’s attorney, 
“[e]verybody loses on this one.”36  
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C.  John Q
Like The Rainmaker, John Q features a working-class parent up 
against a powerful corporate entity. The parent in John Q, however, 
a working-class everyman figure played by Denzel Washington, 
foregoes lawyers and the courtroom and seeks justice on his own. 
John Q. Archibald is a long-time Illinois factory worker, recently 
reduced to twenty hours a week and struggling to find a second job 
to make ends meet. One of the first scenes juxtaposes the sound 
of President George W. Bush on television discussing the failing 
economy with the repossession of the Archibald family station 
wagon, immediately and obviously introducing the theme of 
economic disparities, the haves versus the have-nots. 
John’s son, Mikey, collapses at a Little League game and is rushed to 
the hospital. After Mikey is admitted to the hospital, the Archibalds 
are ushered from the dingy limbo of the emergency room into a 
well-appointed conference room to meet with the Chief of Cardi-
ology, Dr. Turner, and the hospital administrator, Ms. Payne. Dr. 
Turner explains that Mikey needs an immediate heart transplant, 
and given his medical condition and blood type, he would be at the 
top of the organ transplant waiting list. Unfortunately, Ms. Payne 
explains that the Archibald’s insurance is insufficient to cover the 
minimum cost of $250,000, and the hospital will not place Mikey 
on the organ transplant waiting list without a down payment of 
$75,000. When confronted with the seeming heartlessness of her 
decision, she responds, “[i]t costs money to provide health care. 
It’s expensive for you, it’s expensive for us.”37  
Speaking with a nurse after the meeting, the uncomprehending 
Archibalds ask why Mikey’s condition was not caught sooner. She 
replies, “HMOs pay the doctors not to test. That’s how they keep 
costs down.”38  She also warns them that the results will be the 
same, if not worse, at the nearby public hospital and urges them 
to explore all options to secure payment.
John first tries to work with his insurer. The human resource repre-
sentative at his work explains that he now has a $20,000 lifetime 
limit on his health insurance benefits as a result of two factors: the 
factory switched from a preferred provider organization (PPO) 39  to a 
more restrictive HMO plan, a less expensive option for the factory; 
and John recently went from full-time to part-time employment, 
making him eligible for a less comprehensive level of coverage. 
His request for authorization for the transplant is denied and his 
appeal abandoned as futile.40  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=578321
 Journal of Health Law – Spring 2004
Missed
Opportunity
275
Health Insurance
A succession of scenes shows John trying to secure coverage or 
funds elsewhere by the following methods: applying for Illinois’s 
Medicaid program; inquiring at the public hospital; accepting do-
nations from sympathetic but equally strapped workers, friends, 
and parishioners; selling the family’s belongings, including the 
refrigerator, the remaining family car, and his wife’s engagement 
ring; and trying to interest the local media. John’s applications 
for Medicaid and private charitable coverage are denied, and his 
fundraising efforts fall far short of the required $75,000 down 
payment. Ms. Payne notifies the Archibalds that she must release 
Mikey from the hospital to die at home. 
A desperate John approaches Dr. Turner to plead with him to do the 
operation, agreeing to do whatever it takes to pay the full price: 
This hospital does over three hundred heart surger-
ies a year. Three hundred surgeries, two hundred 
fifty thousand a pop. . . . That’s seventy five million 
dollars worth of heart surgeries and you’re telling me 
you can’t do one for me in good faith? . . . I’m not 
asking you to waive your fee . . . I can pay. I swear to 
God I’ll pay you the money back. I don’t know how 
I’m going to do it, but I promise you I will. You just 
gotta trust me. I give you my word as a man.41 
When his appeal fails, he pulls a gun, and takes Dr. Turner and the 
emergency room hostage in a bid to get Mikey’s name on the organ 
transplant waiting list. 
Despite his violent actions, the film goes to great lengths to portray 
John Q as an honorable, caring everyman, one whom even the 
hostages describe as “a good man.” He arranges for the emergency 
room patients to get care, declaring “[t]he hospital is under new 
management. From now on, free health care for everybody.” He 
also oversees life-saving surgery for a gunshot victim (without 
verifying insurance coverage),42  releases vulnerable hostages, and 
exposes one of the hostages as a perpetrator of domestic violence. 
It is later revealed that his gun was never loaded. Aided by live 
media coverage, he becomes a folk hero to the gathering crowds 
outside the hospital.
Inside, John also engages the surprisingly talkative group of hos-
tages in a discussion of Mikey’s experience with managed care:
John:   How could the doctor’s not have picked 
[Mikey’s condition] up?
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Turner: He may not have been tested thoroughly 
enough.
John:  Why not?
Intern: You got an HMO, right? Well, that’s your 
answer. HMOs pay their doctors not to test. That’s 
their way of keeping costs down. Let’s say Mike did 
need additional testing and insurance says they 
won’t cover them. The doctor keeps his mouth shut 
and, come Christmas, the HMO sends the doctor a 
fat-ass bonus check.
John: Is that true?
Turner: Possible. Not likely, but possible.43 
Emboldened by the frank discussion, an intern describes the even 
worse situation for the uninsured in the emergency room, despite 
the law: “if you don’t have any money, you get a band aid, a foot 
in the ass, and you’re out the door.”44  
As time runs out for an existing heart to be transplanted, John 
convinces the now repentant Dr. Turner to take John’s own heart 
for his son. Meanwhile, Ms. Payne also has a change of heart and 
puts Mikey on the organ transplant waiting list, and a matching 
heart becomes available for Mikey. Mikey and John are saved, and 
the hostage crisis ends without serious injury to anyone.
Following John’s arrest, we see a montage of media response to the 
crisis and its end interwoven with actual clips of people such as 
Hillary Clinton, Jesse Jackson, Arianna Huffington, Gloria Allred, 
Jay Leno, Larry King, and Bill Maher offering a variety of viewpoints 
on the healthcare crisis. These fade into a courtroom scene in which 
John is convicted of kidnapping and false imprisonment, while 
the gallery, including several of the hostages, cheers his acquit-
tal on the more serious charges of attempted murder and armed 
criminal action. John will likely serve two or three years in prison, 
but his son will live.
II. Why Did Health Insurers Emerge as 
Villains in the Late 1990s? 
The overwhelmingly negative portrayal of the state of health 
insurance today—a system “as collapsed and comatose and near 
death”45  as Dr. Ernst’s unconscious patients—arises in the context 
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of a powerful consumer backlash against managed care in the 
1990s. Indeed, the intensity and emotional power of the images 
accurately reflect the public’s dismal opinion of the health-insur-
ance companies and the managed care strategies they employ. 
A. The Historical Context: A Brief History of Managed Care 
As many have documented, until the 1990s, most private health 
coverage was indemnity insurance following a fee-for-service 
model.46  The insured or his employer purchased a policy from a 
health insurer that assumed the risk of the potentially high cost of 
medical care in the event of the insured’s disease or injury.47  When 
the insured received care, the insurer reimbursed the healthcare 
provider for the cost of each service, such as an office visit, proce-
dure, or medical supply. This is the type of health insurance policy 
extolled by Dr. Butz in Critical Care: “with [traditional] insurance 
we get paid to perform medical procedures. . . . I get a cut of every 
procedure we do on the guy.”48 
As Dr. Butz’s comment suggests, one problem with this arrange-
ment is that individual patients were free to use more healthcare 
services without additional payment, and healthcare providers 
were free to provide more healthcare services for additional reim-
bursement. This led to increased use of healthcare services, which, 
along with other factors, resulted in ballooning healthcare expen-
ditures in the 1980s.49  Private health insurers sought to control 
expenditures fostered by the traditional fee-for-service structure 
through a variety of strategies designed to change the incentives 
of healthcare providers and consumers to provide and use care.50  
They employed a variety of organizational, managerial, and reim-
bursement strategies, including: preauthorization requirements; 
consumer co-payments; capitation payments, where one pay-
ment is made to the provider for each enrolled patient’s care for a 
specified period, regardless of the amount of treatment provided; 
restriction of patient choice to the healthcare providers within a 
defined network, often comprised of providers who agree to ac-
cept a discounted rate of reimbursement; and healthcare provider 
incentive arrangements.51  The term “managed care,” coined in the 
1990s, describes such strategies designed to control the cost and 
use of healthcare.52  A widely used but inexact term, managed care 
has been aptly described as “a fusion of two functions that once 
were regarded as largely separate: the financing of medical care 
and the delivery of medical services.”53  
Managed care’s initial success at cost-containment was a welcome 
message to insurance purchasers, particularly purchasers of group 
policies, such as private employers.54  Indeed, many employers 
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moved their employees into lower-cost managed care plans and 
away from the more expensive fee-for-service plans in the 1990s.55  
By the late 1990s, however, managed care’s initial success at con-
trolling costs had waned, and consumers and providers of health-
care began to object to many of its cost-containment strategies.56  
The vehement and powerful consumer protests became known 
as the managed care backlash.57  While some of the techniques 
employed by managed care, and HMOs in particular, may have 
been objectionable in and of themselves, the historical shift from a 
relatively generous fee-for-service arrangement to widespread use 
of more controlled and cost-conscious managed care arrangements 
appears to have played a major role in fueling consumer resent-
ment. As suggested by Alain V. Enthoven, a healthcare economist 
often described as one of the “fathers of managed care,” the root of 
the consumer backlash is the lack of information given to consum-
ers regarding the reasons for and consequences of the large-scale 
switch to cost-controlling measures employed by organizations 
such as HMOs and the subsequent perception of HMOs as a “take-
way” of benefits.58  
Today, the historical distinction between private health insurance 
and managed care has blurred. Outside of the federal Medicare 
program,59  unrestricted fee-for-service insurance is increasingly 
rare,60  and virtually all private health-insurance incorporates some 
aspect of managed care.61 
B.  The Dismal Public Opinion of Health Insurance  
Companies and Managed Care 
At the same time private health insurance was increasingly turning 
away from the traditionally generous fee-for-service model and 
toward the diverse cost-controlling strategies of managed care, 
the public’s perception of private health-insurance companies fell 
dramatically.62  In recent years, the number of consumers report-
ing that managed care plans do a “bad job” serving consumers has 
almost doubled.63  As of 2002, surveyed consumers reported that 
the managed care industry served its customers poorly, ranking it 
at the bottom of the list of industries, along with tobacco and oil 
companies.64  They also reported that dealing with health insurance 
is stressful—nearly as stressful as doing their taxes.65 
Though a few recent studies suggest that the plummeting opinion 
of managed care strategies may be bottoming out,66  the level of 
public distrust of health insurers and of managed care companies 
is shockingly high. Surveys suggest that very few people believe 
statements made by managed care or health insurance compa-
nies. Only seven percent of consumers believed that health insur-
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ance companies are generally honest and trustworthy and only 
four percent believe the same about managed care companies.67  
When asked how much they would trust various industries to “do 
the right thing if faced with a serious problem with one of their 
products,” consumers ranked the health-insurance and man-
aged care companies very low, only slightly above the tobacco 
and oil industries.68  The majority of consumers worry that if they 
become ill, “their health plan [would] be more concerned about 
saving money than providing the best treatment.”69  Those with 
plans that are more restrictive expressed even greater concern.70  
Moreover, surveys suggest that nearly three-quarters of Americans 
believe that managed care plans keep the savings achieved using 
cost-containment strategies.71 
Although these studies demonstrate an overwhelmingly negative 
public opinion of private health insurance and its reliance on man-
aged care strategies, it is difficult to draw a conclusion as to the basis 
for such an opinion. It seems unlikely that consumers base their 
opinions on full knowledge of the studies and statistics associated 
with the strategies of managed care. Some studies suggest that the 
high level of consumer dissatisfaction and distrust arises in signifi-
cant part from personal experiences with managed care and health 
insurance companies.72  A study in 2001 by the Kaiser Family Foun-
dation found that over half of private healthcare consumers under 
sixty-five experienced a problem with their healthcare plan, such as 
a delay or denial of coverage or care, difficulty seeing a physician, a 
billing or payment problem, or a customer service problem in the 
past year.73  Moreover, women, those in more restrictive managed 
care plans, those in fair or poor health, and those with a health 
condition were more likely to report problems.74  Although most 
consumers reported relatively minor consequences, a “substantial 
minority of people with problems experienced financial losses, 
lost time from life activities, or declines in health” as a result of 
the problems.75  Interestingly, a few recent studies report consumer 
opinions of their own health insurance plans to be less harsh than 
of health insurance plans in general and suggest that the discrep-
ancy is due to negative media coverage of private health insurance 
and managed care.76 
In any event, public support for consumer protection in healthcare 
is high.77  Even after the events of September 11, 2001, Americans 
surveyed identified healthcare as a critical issue for the nation, just 
behind terrorism and national security.78  Americans also identified 
healthcare as a critical personal issue, as they are more worried 
about healthcare costs than losing their job, paying their rent or 
mortgage, losing money in the stock market, or being a victim of 
a terrorist attack.79  Notwithstanding the growing consensus for 
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reform,80  support declines when consequences such as cost or 
employers dropping coverage are raised.81  
III. Is the Health Insurance System 
Failing in the Ways These Films 
Suggest?
Scholars of law and popular culture have long argued that “popu-
lar culture mirrors, often in an exaggerated and caricatured form, 
actual popular attitudes and beliefs about the institutions and 
characters that it describes.”82  The harsh tone of these films cer-
tainly reflects the critical and concerned attitude of the public. 
The impact of these films83  and their resonance with consumers’ 
concerns has not gone unnoticed by politicians84  or by the private 
health insurance industry itself.85  These films also articulate certain 
common beliefs about private health insurance and its reliance 
on the strategies of managed care. At least in the case of John Q, 
there is evidence that the public believes that the film accurately 
reflects the reality of modern private health insurance for workers 
and their families.86  Is the system really failing in the ways these 
films suggest?
A.  The Uninsured and Access to Care 
All three films suggest that people without insurance are routinely 
denied care—even life-saving care. In The Rainmaker, Baylor laments 
the “obscene” fate of Donny Ray, denied a life-saving operation 
and left to die for lack of a legitimate insurance policy. Although 
John Q focuses on the impact of underinsurance, the treatment of 
Mikey as a “cash account” requiring a sizeable down payment prior 
to receiving care, coupled with the intern’s commentary on what 
the uninsured can expect in the emergency room, make clear that 
the uninsured who cannot afford to pay cannot expect to receive 
necessary care. In Critical Care, Dr. Butz argues that the uninsured 
“rowdy kid[s]” should not get any service, including healthcare, 
for which they cannot pay.87  
It is well-documented that people without insurance receive less 
care, delayed care, and suffer worse outcomes than people with 
insurance.88  Although health insurance is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to receive healthcare, “[h]ealth insurance makes a differ-
ence in when and if people get necessary medical care, where they 
get their care, and ultimately, how healthy people are.”89  People 
without insurance coverage or the ability to pay are three times 
as likely to forgo a necessary doctor visit, prescription, or medical 
test or treatment,90  three to four times more likely to “experience 
problems getting needed medical care, even for serious condi-
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tions,”91  and three times as likely to have a medical need that goes 
unmet.92  Unfortunately, this is true even for children like Donny 
Ray and Mikey, as children without insurance are six times as likely 
to have gone without necessary healthcare, four times more likely 
to experience a delay in care, and up to forty percent less likely to 
receive medical attention even for a serious injury.93  Indeed, a third 
of uninsured children did not see a doctor in the past year. 94 
As suggested by the discussion of Mikey’s condition in John Q, the 
delay and denial of treatment can lead to more serious illness and 
worse health outcomes for the uninsured.95  Indeed, people without 
insurance are more likely to experience avoidable hospitalizations 
and die during hospitalizations,96  and uninsured cancer patients 
die sooner than those with insurance, largely because of delayed 
diagnosis.97 
Nor are these disparities limited to preventative or non-urgent care, 
as the emergency room intern in John Q suggests. Nonetheless, the 
intern’s characterization of the treatment of the uninsured in the 
emergency room, notwithstanding the hospitals’ legal duty—“if 
you don’t have any money, you get a Band-Aid, a foot in the ass, 
and you’re out the door”98 —appears unnecessarily bleak. Indeed, 
Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor 
Act (EMTALA)99  in 1986 to avoid such a result.100  EMTALA requires 
that a patient who arrives at the emergency room of a hospital that 
participates in the Medicaid program be provided with a medical 
screening and stabilization of any emergency medical condition, 
regardless of ability to pay.101  Thus, if the intern’s hypothetical pa-
tient arrived at the emergency room with an emergency medical 
condition, the hospital would have a duty to screen the patient 
and to stabilize any known emergency medical condition prior to 
kicking him “out the door” through discharge or transfer.102  
The depiction of Mikey’s treatment in John Q appears to be a more 
realistic example of the impact of nonexistent or insufficient 
insurance. Consistent with the mandates of EMTALA, Mikey was 
diagnosed upon arrival at the emergency room, and his condition 
was stabilized to the extent possible. As Mikey’s treatment sug-
gests, however, EMTALA does not require the hospital to provide 
complete or continuous care beyond stabilization of the immedi-
ate emergency condition.103  Nor does it eliminate disparities in 
the level or amount of services that patients receive in emergency 
rooms for urgent conditions. For example, the Institute of Medi-
cine’s recent review of the literature revealed that people without 
insurance who experience traumatic injuries are “less likely to be 
admitted to the hospital, receive fewer services when admitted, 
and are more likely to die than insured trauma victims.”104 
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As also dramatized in these films, people without insurance do 
not regularly receive healthcare on a no- or low-cost basis.105  Most 
people without insurance pay for healthcare out-of-pocket, with 
a credit card, or on a payment schedule.106  Medical care devastates 
the financial health of many families without insurance.107  This is 
particularly disturbing in light of the evidence that people without 
insurance may be charged a higher price for the same services and 
medicines than people with private insurance.108 
Although John Q suggests an unnecessarily stark outcome for the 
uninsured in the emergency room, the overall portrayal of the 
plight of the uninsured in each of these films does have significant 
factual support in light of the strong and well-documented link 
between lack of coverage and lack of access to care. 
B. The Effect of Reimbursement Arrangements on  
Treatment Decisions 
For patients who have insurance, Critical Care and John Q suggest 
that managed care reimbursement arrangements distort their 
doctors’ professional and medical judgment. Critical Care makes 
the case most overtly, starting with its tag line: “At Memorial 
Hospital, no one ever dies . . . Until their insurance runs out.”109  
Traditionally-insured patients, such as Mr. Potter, are subject to 
unnecessary and futile care for the sake of the insurance reimburse-
ment. In contrast, those with managed care receive only the care 
that will be reimbursed, and not the type of care that doctors are 
financially rewarded for withholding. These are the patients that 
Dr. Hofsteader’s protégées seems to have in mind as “[those] we 
chose not to maintain.”110  
John Q also plays upon the theme of the perverse and distorting 
effect of reimbursement; focusing on the financial incentives for 
healthcare providers in a managed care setting to provide less, 
rather than more, care for their managed care patients.111  Early 
on, a nurse tells the Archibalds that Mikey’s condition wasn’t 
caught sooner because “HMOs pay the doctors not to test. That’s 
how they keep costs down,”112  a theme echoed in the discussion 
about managed care among the hostages. Although the narrative 
stops short of actually asserting that any tests were denied on this 
basis, or even that earlier testing would have made a difference in 
Mikey’s case, the corrupting effect of financial incentives for phy-
sicians to provide less care is invoked by sympathetic characters 
throughout the film.
The problem of inappropriate or excessive care dramatized in Criti-
cal Care was identified as a problem under private fee-for-service 
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indemnity plans.113  As discussed, unrestricted fee-for-service insur-
ance is increasingly rare outside of the federal Medicare program, 
and virtually all private health insurance incorporates some aspect 
of managed care. 114  Thus, in the context of these films, the problem 
of “too much care” under fee-for-service plans functions mainly as 
a foil to the presumed problem of “too little care” under modern 
private health insurance plans.115 
There is considerable information about the types of financial 
incentives used by managed care to reduce the use of healthcare 
services, as well as the conflicts of interest they create for physi-
cians.116  As noted by Professor Marc Rodwin in his 1993 book, 
Medicine, Money and Morals: Physician’s Conflicts of Interest, there is 
significantly less information about whether these incentives actu-
ally affect the clinical decisions of physicians.117  Some data indicate, 
however, that financial incentives may affect physicians’ decisions 
to provide certain types of care and perhaps even information about 
certain types of care. As noted by Professor Rodwin, a 1989 study 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine found that some, 
but not all, types of financial incentives influenced the behavior 
of physicians toward patients. Specifically, it found “no relation-
ship between distribution of risk-sharing bonuses and physicians’ 
referral decisions, . . . [b]ut paying physicians by capitation led to 
lower rates of hospitalization, and placing physicians at financial 
risk was associated with lower rates of outpatient visits.”118  
Since Professor Rodwin’s work was published, at least one addi-
tional study has found that financial incentives may affect physi-
cians’ decisions to provide certain types of care, to the detriment 
of patients.119  In addition, a recent national survey of physicians 
found that almost a third reported that they did not tell their pa-
tients about a useful treatment because they believed the patient’s 
insurance would not cover it.120  Physicians who had a financial 
stake in the profits of the managed care plan were more likely to 
withhold treatment option information.121 
The evidence, however, is far from conclusive. There is a dearth of 
more recent studies focusing on specific and recent managed care 
organizations, management strategies, reimbursement arrange-
ments, and their influence, if any on the clinical judgments of phy-
sicians. Nor is it clear that physicians actually withhold medically 
necessary or appropriate care in response to such arrangements. 
Indeed, there is significant evidence that physicians have employed 
deception, both currently and in the past, to resist the influence of 
reimbursement arrangements on their clinical decisions.122 
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Despite the paucity of direct and timely evidence, many consum-
ers, physicians, and managed care executives believe that financial 
incentives affect physicians’ decisions to provide certain types of 
care.123  Consumers have claimed that reimbursement arrange-
ments distort physician’s clinical judgment to the detriment of 
patients for over a decade, although with little success.124  Physi-
cians also remain concerned, as noted in a recent article in the New 
England Journal of Medicine: “[e]ven within the medical profession, 
prominent voices have warned that physicians cannot be trusted 
if they are paid more to do less.”125 
Thus, Critical Care and John Q draw attention to the widely-held 
fear that reimbursement arrangements distort treatment decisions 
to the detriment of patients, a belief that is suggested, although 
not clearly supported, by the available evidence.
C.  The Erosion of Employment-Based Coverage 
John Q focuses on the nature and consequences of the erosion of 
employment-based health insurance coverage.126  John, with fifteen 
years of experience as a heavy machine operator, no longer has 
insurance that will cover his son’s life-saving transplant because 
of his employer’s switch to a cheaper HMO and his drop to part-
time status. John Q’s depiction of the erosion of employment-based 
health insurance is troublingly accurate, as “[w]orkers and their de-
pendents are increasingly at risk of being uninsured, inadequately 
insured, or lacking in choices among health plans.”127  Like John, 
most Americans get their health insurance through their employ-
ment. In 2001, 62.6% of workers and their families were covered by 
employer-sponsored health plans.128  As John’s experience drama-
tizes, however, employment does not guarantee coverage, adequate 
or otherwise. Employment-based coverage is strongly associated 
with employer size and level of wage, with low-wage, part-time, 
or small-employer workers most likely to lack coverage.129  Today, 
nearly one in five workers is uninsured,130  and eighty percent of 
the uninsured come from working families.131  Further, the number 
of workers without insurance is growing.132 
As suggested in John Q, one of the reasons for the erosion of em-
ployment-based insurance is the increasing cost of coverage for 
employers and to employees. In response to the powerful backlash 
against the cost-controlling strategies of managed care, many 
employers moved away from the more restrictive managed care 
plan features and toward features that offered employees more 
choice.133  As a result of this move and other factors, group health 
insurance premiums began to rise again in the late 1990s and have 
risen sharply since 2000.134  This trend is also likely to continue, as 
premiums are expected to rise to even higher rates in 2004.135 
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Faced with spiraling costs, employers are increasingly likely to pass 
on more of the costs to their employees. Indeed, the amount the 
employees pay for employer-sponsored health benefits has risen 
significantly since 2001 and is expected to rise up to 24.2% over 
2003.136  Available data suggest that an increasing number of work-
ers will forgo coverage as the costs continue to rise.137 
As the actions of John’s fictionalized employer suggest, employers 
are also offering fewer benefits, often to fewer employees, trying 
to control costs by raising annual deductibles and specific co-pay-
ments, limiting benefits, as well as limiting or eliminating coverage 
for part-time or low-wage workers.138  Recently, there have been 
reports in the press that employers are cutting health insurance 
benefits for employee spouses and children, or offering incentives 
to get families out of their health plans.139  Although not raised by 
these films, an employer’s ability to reduce or eliminate health 
insurance benefits based on protected characteristics such as race, 
sex,140  age,141  and disability142  are limited by federal civil rights law. 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974143  (ERISA) 
also prohibits an employer from terminating an employee for the 
purpose of interfering with the worker’s protected rights to benefits 
under the terms of its health insurance plan.144 
Notwithstanding these legal limitations, the trend toward shrink-
ing benefits is likely to continue.145  According to a 2002 study by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation, employees experienced less, rather 
than more, benefits in 2002 for the first time in four years.146  As a 
result, workers like John who manage to retain coverage may find 
themselves underinsured.147  Indeed, many workers have even more 
limited benefits than John. Consider, for example the emergence 
of so-called “limited benefit” plans offered for under $10 per week 
but with a benefit cap—not deductible—of $1,000. According to 
a recent article in The Wall Street Journal, about 750,000 workers 
and their family members at companies such as McDonald’s and 
Wal-Mart are already covered under such plans.148 
Asking workers to pay more while many are receiving less creates 
conflict, particularly as employees do not feel responsible for higher 
healthcare costs.149  A recent poll revealed that fewer than half of 
the respondent employees believe that employers are unable to 
absorb the increases or that it is fair for employers to ask employees 
to pay more for health insurance.150  Increases in employee con-
tributions to health benefits sparked the strike at General Electric 
(GE) in January of 2003, the first national strike against GE in 
thirty years.151 Thousands of unionized GE workers protested GE’s 
increases in health insurance co-payments for emergency room 
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visits, prescription drugs, specialists, and hospital stays—reported 
to cost the average employee as much as $400 per year.152  As one 
reporter noted: 
This is the first time in more than three decades that 
GE workers have felt passionate enough about any 
issue to stage a national strike, one that spread to 
48 locations in 23 states, affecting plants that make 
everything from consumer products to jet engines. 
The catalyzing issue, in this case, had nothing to do 
with wages, job cuts, or factory safety. It had to do 
with fast rising health costs—and who was going 
to pay for them.153 
 
While the narrative of John Q effectively calls attention to the ero-
sion of employment-based insurance coverage, it obscures the 
availability of important but limited protections for workers and 
their families without adequate health insurance. For example, if 
John had lost his health insurance benefits as a result of the reduc-
tion in hours or lost his job entirely, he probably would be eligible 
to continue his health insurance coverage for eighteen months at 
the group rate under the federal Consolidated Omnibus Reconcili-
ation Act of 1985 (COBRA).154  Continuation coverage could not 
be denied on the basis of Mikey’s health,155  but John would have 
to pay the entire premium plus a small administrative fee.156  Once 
John exhausted his COBRA extension period, and assuming that 
other conditions were met,157  he could be eligible to purchase an 
individual policy pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accessibility Act (HIPAA).158  The individual coverage could not 
exclude pre-existing conditions such as Mikey’s heart condition, 
and the policy would be guaranteed renewable.159  Unfortunately, 
the cost could be prohibitive under this option, in that HIPAA does 
not limit the premium that the offering insurer may charge.160  
In addition, the treatment of John’s application for and denial of 
coverage for Mikey under public programs, specifically Medicaid,161  
appears misleading. Medicaid is a public program funded jointly 
by the federal and state governments to provide coverage to the 
poorest and most vulnerable Americans, including 24 million 
children.162  Based on the limited facts provided by the film,163  it is 
unclear if Mikey would be eligible for Medicaid coverage in Illinois, 
which currently provides coverage for children between the ages 
of six and nineteen at an income level of $19,258.164  
More likely, Mikey would be eligible for his state’s Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP), a program that expands coverage to 
millions of additional children whose parents earn too much 
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to quality for Medicaid yet too little to buy private coverage.165  
Illinois’s CHIP program, KidCare, covers children in families at 
200% of the federal poverty level, or $30,516 for a family of three 
in 2003.166  KidCare would also be available to reimburse John for 
the premiums he pays for Mikey’s coverage, and to cover services 
that his employer-sponsored plan does not cover.167 
Thus, John Q effectively calls attention to the erosion of employ-
ment-based insurance coverage, a disturbing reality for an increas-
ing number of workers and their families. It obscures, however, 
several significant but limited restrictions on an employer’s abil-
ity to limit benefits, as well as the existence of private and public 
coverage options.
IV. The Dissolving Critique: Retreating 
Into Private, Individualistic Solutions 
Beyond their value as entertainment, why should we care about the 
images presented in these films? To paraphrase Professor Michael 
Asimow, these films can teach us what the insurance company does 
and what is wrong with health insurance and managed care institu-
tions.168  They can also teach us how health insurance and managed 
care arrangements affect consumers and their families. Indeed, we 
would expect that images of health insurance and managed care 
companies would “reflec[t] the already existing perception of [these 
arrangements] even as it helps to model and reinforce [them].”169  
Despite inaccuracies and omissions, which tend to capitalize on 
public mistrust and misperceptions,170  the premises raised by the 
films have significant factual support. There is a link between lack 
of coverage and lack of access to care; reimbursement arrange-
ments may distort treatment decisions, and certainly are believed 
to do so; and workers and their families are losing adequate health 
coverage. Moreover, they tell an important symbolic or emotional 
truth about the gross disparities between the treatment of the 
uninsured and the insured, even though the specifics of each of 
the stories may not be complete or factually true. As noted by one 
commentator on the factual accuracy of John Q:
The heart transplant is just the narrative tool that 
has been used to tell a deeper story. . . I think this 
is a film about disparities in care, and I suspect 
that the vast majority of people who see the film 
are, subconsciously, going to be reacting to it on 
the level of disparities in care, and not on the level 
of, is this literally, technically correct about heart 
transplantation.171 
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In addition to their ability to educate and move audiences, these 
films provide a window into the public perception of the current 
crisis in health coverage and healthcare and what we plan to do 
about it. If these films present a strong critique of the current system, 
what can we learn from the solutions, if any, that they offer?
A.  The Dissolving Critique:  
Three Private, Individualistic Solutions 
These films capture the intensity of the managed care backlash at 
its height, and dramatize certain truths—symbolic or emotional, 
if not always literal—about the consumer experience of managed 
care. A close reading reveals that despite their passionately criti-
cal tone, these films actually put forward solutions that are highly 
individualist and conservative, rather than inclusive and systemic. 
Although each film appears to be a daring and defiant attack on 
the healthcare system and its institutions, in reality the films do 
not threaten the status quo in any meaningful way. Instead, the 
resolution of each of the narratives comes about through the ac-
tions of one individual—one good doctor, one good attorney tak-
ing one good case, and, most disturbingly, one good father with a 
gun—and resolves the situation of one patient.
The climax of Critical Care is the guardianship hearing in which Dr. 
Ernst decides to protect his patient instead of his professional pres-
tige. Watching each of the self-serving participants in the “care” 
of Mr. Potter denounced in turn is satisfying, and we are relieved 
when Dr. Ernst is able to resolve the legal dispute and take charge 
of Mr. Potter’s care. Despite the lingering presence of Dr. Butz and 
his avaricious philosophy, the last scene makes clear that Dr. Ernst 
will go on to care for and love his patients. 
What will be the fate, however, of patients without a Dr. Ernst? 
Instead of challenging a system that encourages too much care 
for the overinsured, too little for the underinsured, and none for 
the uninsured, the answer is for a good doctor to resist the power-
ful financial and professional incentives to provide a level of care 
other than that medically appropriate for the patient. Although 
we can be gratified by Dr. Ernst’s transformation, we should still be 
deeply afraid of being admitted to Hope Memorial, at least when 
he is not on call. 
Unlike the ray of hope offered in the form of caring individuals such 
as Nurse Stella and Dr. Ernst, everybody loses in The Rainmaker. Bay-
lor wins the Black’s case, but Donny Ray is dead and Great Benefit’s 
executives escape with the “pot of gold.” The legal system, or more 
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specifically private, individual litigation against Great Benefit, is 
not able to bring justice to the Blacks. In fact, the legal system is 
seen by Baylor as so corrupting that he retires from the practice of 
law rather than risk losing his soul for another legal victory. The 
idea of meaningful reform beyond the tragedy of Donny Ray is 
floated briefly by Great Benefit at the end of the trial, but only as a 
scare tactic.172  In the end, the poor of Memphis are no longer the 
prey of Great Benefit, but they are no more able to afford health 
insurance than they were before the lawsuit. 
Five years after The Rainmaker, John Q shows us an even bleaker 
world, in which the underinsured are denied life-saving care, and 
left without any legal remedy. As the tag line suggests, violence, or 
the threat of violence, is the only alternative: “Give a father no op-
tions and you leave him no choice.”173  Despite John’s proclamation 
of “Free health care for everyone!,” he makes clear that he is not 
asking for “charity”—only a single exception to the down payment 
requirement to allow him more time to pay the entire cost. There 
is no meaningful inquiry into the dramatically increasing costs of 
healthcare, or critique of a system of private insurance that links 
adequate coverage to employer’s economic choices and employees’ 
full-time employment. Certain scenes, such as the speech of one 
of John’s co-workers to the media, do suggest such questions: 
This whole thing . . . it all could have been avoided so 
incredibly easy. I mean, none of this had to happen. 
If John had just been a friggin’ millionaire, right? 
Or if his last name was Rockefeller. But y’know John 
don’t get it. He don’t understand that what we hold 
dear in the country isn’t values, it’s value that’s im-
portant. . . . There’s a lot of people out there—a lot 
of people here—who don’t have $250,000 in their 
billfold, but to shame a man like that and back him 
into a corner. Seems to me that something is out of 
whack, not someone. . . . But what do I know . . . I’m 
a factory worker. 
Although this scene can be read as a critique of a system in which 
only great disparities in wealth lead to great disparities in care, its 
potential force is blunted by the individualistic and melodramatic 
tone of the end of the film. Despite suggestive scenes such as this 
one and the jumbled montage of commentators toward the end 
of the film, we are left with the sense that rather than working for 
meaningful reform, we are all, like John, “waiting for an act of 
God.”174  
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The first of the three films released, Critical Care, comes closest 
to suggesting the possibility of real change. Perhaps this is due in 
part because it effectively and powerfully plays upon the author’s 
perspective both as a respiratory therapist in intensive care units 
and as a lawyer to fashion its critique and its solution.175  Dr. Ernst’s 
transformation occurs in time to rescue Mr. Potter from further 
futile and invasive treatment, and is portrayed as a permanent 
change in the way Dr. Ernst views himself as a doctor. Near the 
end of the film, Dr. Ernst is able to withstand Nurse Stella’s test 
of his newfound resolve with both his compassion and sense of 
humor intact: 
Nurse Stella:  Doesn’t really change anything, you 
know. This patient will be gone when you come 
back tomorrow but there’ll be a new patient in his 
place and everything else will be the same. Disease, 
injury, old age, all the same old problems will be 
here. Hosftader, Butz, it’ll all be the same.
Dr. Ernst:  No it won’t.
Nurse Stella:  No?
Dr. Ernst:  How could it? Tomorrow is the start 
of National Pickle Week.
This scene also shows that Dr. Ernst is not alone—he joins the ranks 
of providers such as Nurse Stella, who work secretly and perhaps 
outside the “system” in terms of the rules of the profession and 
even the law, to ease the suffering of patients.176  Thus, although Dr. 
Ernst’s transformation is private and individual, it does underscore 
the idea that one individual can make a difference in the lives of 
others, and that change can happen one person at a time. 
Notwithstanding this interpretation of Critical Care, these films 
raise serious questions about our health insurance and healthcare 
arrangements on a systemic level, but ultimately retreat into in-
dividualistic and deeply conservative solutions. Even As Good As 
It Gets neatly resolves its single anti-HMO scene177  with a private, 
individualist solution—all medical expenses, including house 
calls by a kindly, expert physician, will be paid by a wealthy friend. 
Moreover, The Rainmaker and John Q can be read as suggesting that 
the problem is a flaw in the system, rather than a flawed system. In 
The Rainmaker, Great Benefit is portrayed as so thoroughly and ir-
redeemably corrupt that the narrative never engages more difficult 
questions, such as why must so many poor families go without af-
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fordable health insurance and how can a society provide adequate 
healthcare for all?178  
Similarly, a heartless hospital administrator appears to create, and 
ultimately resolve, the problem in John Q; no blame is laid on the 
erosion of employment-based health insurance or the potentially 
bankrupting cost of life-saving care.179  This does not resolve the 
larger questions raised by the narrative, such as: Who should pay 
for the healthcare? How should we prioritize limited resources? 
What alternatives exist to an employment-linked, market-based 
system?180  The narrative also implicitly raises questions about the 
sufficiency of our public healthcare programs, as well as the efficacy 
of existing federal legislative initiatives, which are left unexplored. 
Instead of following through on the large, systemic issues they 
raise, the resolution of each of the narratives comes about through 
the actions of one individual—one good doctor, one good attorney 
taking one good case, and, most disturbingly, one good father with 
a gun—and resolves the situation of one patient.
B.  A Similar Shift in Health Insurance:  
The New Consumer-Directed Health Plans 
The “dissolving critique” of these films is significant because it 
resonates with similar shifts in current healthcare policy, evidenced 
by the turn toward consumer-driven health plans. Since the first 
of these films was released in 1997, healthcare costs have again 
risen dramatically, and “we are back to health care inflation with 
a vengeance.”181  According to the federal government, healthcare 
spending will more than double in the next ten years—to ap-
proximately $3.1 trillion in 2012—outpacing the rate of economic 
expansion.182  At the same time, we are facing a growing crisis of 
uninsurance: 41.2 million Americans were uninsured for an entire 
year in 2001,183  and 75 million Americans were uninsured for at 
least three months during 2001–2002.184  Despite public programs, 
such as Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP, the ranks of the uninsured 
are increasing by a million a year—faster than the rate of overall 
population growth.185 
As suggested by John Q, the employers’ role as major purchasers of 
group health benefits places them in a unique position to influ-
ence developments in health coverage and care for the majority 
of covered Americans.186  In the early 1990s, employers turned to 
managed care to control costs, but retreated from its most restric-
tive practices in the face of a powerful consumer backlash.187  Today, 
it appears that employers are turning toward consumer-driven 
health plans.188 
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The term “consumer-driven health plan” describes a variety of 
different approaches to providing employee health benefits that 
share two common themes: the employer makes a fixed, rather 
than variable, dollar contribution toward the employee’s health 
benefits; and the consumer assumes a greater degree of choice 
and risk in choosing and paying for healthcare.189  For example, 
under a “defined contribution” approach, instead of offering a 
specific health insurance plan or a choice of plans for a set annual 
premium, an employer provides a specific contribution that the 
employee can use to purchase the plan of his choice, either from 
a menu of options provided by the employer, or, in its most pure 
form, from the Yellow Pages.190  Any shortfall between the amount 
of the employer’s defined contribution and the cost of the chosen 
health plan is borne by the employee. 
Another emerging approach is the combination of a high-deduct-
ible catastrophic health insurance policy—typically $1,500 or 
more for an individual—with some form of tax-exempt employee 
spending account that the consumer can use to satisfy all or part of 
the deductible.191  It is unknown whether consumer-driven plans 
can control costs for employers and empower consumers to make 
better and more efficient choices as claimed, and initial consumer 
response to such plans is mixed.192  Notwithstanding some skepti-
cism, many employers report that they will use more consumer-
oriented strategies in healthcare benefits in the coming years.193 
Consumer-driven health plans tout individual choice and freedom 
as the solution to a variety of problems with the current system of 
health coverage and care. In this context, “choice” also includes 
individual responsibility to make the right choices in terms of price 
and quality and the individual obligation to bear the consequences 
of such choices. It remains to be seen whether consumer-driven 
plans will enable individual consumers to make better or more 
appropriate choices and whether “choice” as conceived will lead 
to better financial or health outcomes for consumers.194  Moreover, 
concern that consumer-driven plans will not address systemic 
issues such as the increasingly high cost of healthcare195  and the 
growing crisis of uninsurance and underinsurance,196  or whether 
the plans will disproportionately disadvantage the chronically ill, 
remain to be addressed.197 
Much like how the films raise the critical issues but allow the dra-
matic tension to dissipate into private and individualistic resolu-
tions, the current healthcare crisis raises fundamental and systemic 
issues that are simply not addressed by private, nonsystemic op-
tions, such as emerging consumer-driven health plans. How do you 
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protect yourself as a consumer in the current healthcare system? 
The films suggest you should have a doctor like Werner Ernst, a 
lawyer like Rudy Baylor, or a parent like John Archibald. Similarly, 
the shift toward consumer-directed health plans suggests you 
should simply make better choices.
C.  An Opportunity for Hollywood, Policymakers,  
and Consumers
Faced once again with a healthcare crisis, the retreat into private, 
individual solutions in film and in real life is a missed opportunity 
for Hollywood, policymakers, and healthcare consumers.
Films can play an important role in the development of healthcare 
policy because of their potential to inform and educate the public.198  
At the same time, films are designed to profitably entertain. The 
“dissolving critique” can be seen as an expression of the commer-
cial function of these films because the personal and individualistic 
endings are consistent with our culturally-preferred storytelling 
mode of entertainment. The types of simplistic, unlikely, or even 
impossible solutions portrayed also speak to the fantasy needs of 
the audience: We want to imagine that, like the protagonists, we 
can effect a direct and effective solution to the healthcare crisis with 
common sense or ordinary courage, if only for our loved ones. Like 
John, we want to believe we can “do something.” Indeed, John Q 
can be seen as a dark fantasy of director Nick Cassavetes himself, 
as he dedicated John Q to his daughter Sasha, who suffered from 
congestive heart disease and was a candidate for a heart transplant 
at the time of the film.199 
Given that mainstream films are commercial products, is it fair to 
ask them to propose and defend a systemic, inclusive solution to 
the healthcare crisis?200  As Critical Care, The Rainmaker, John Q, and 
even As Good As It Gets illustrate, it is easier to criticize health insur-
ers or managed care organizations than to propose real solutions 
to the problems raised, particularly while telling an entertaining 
story.201  Films offer a unique opportunity, however, to imagine 
and explore fantasies, including different and more fundamental 
changes to our healthcare system. There is also a rich and powerful 
history of collective concern from which to draw. Despite the pow-
erful influence of conservative ideals, such as rugged individualism 
and self-help in American social welfare policy,202  health insurance 
in the United States began as a social enterprise, and the concept 
of health insurance as a collective concern continues to resonate 
with the public.203  As Deborah Stone has written:
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Insurance is one of the main mechanisms by which 
modern societies define problems as amenable to 
human agency and collective action. Insurance is 
not only an institution of repair, but also of social 
progress. Insurance is a major way that communities 
can make life better for their individual members. 
As a mechanism for providing security and fostering 
collaboration, insurance offers polities the moral 
opportunity to strengthen the sense of community 
and collective well-being.204 
Despite erosion of the social enterprise model in healthcare 
policy,205  many continue to believe that, as John states in John Q, 
“[w]hen people are sick they deserve a little help.” The social, col-
lective roots of health insurance can be seen in the campaign for 
universal health coverage in the United States. The campaign has 
been waged for nearly a century206  and was exemplified recently 
in a proposal published by the Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation and endorsed by nearly 8,000 doctors, urging universal 
health insurance coverage though a single-payor, government-
financed system.207 
As discussed, there is a growing consensus for change, even radical 
change, to our healthcare system that echoes these social and col-
lective roots.208  Most Americans believe in the principle of equal 
access to healthcare for the rich and the poor, with the healthier and 
wealthier subsidizing the cost of care for the sicker and poorer.209  
Many support a systemic solution. Consider a recent poll in which 
sixty-nine percent of respondents agreed that “the government 
should do whatever is necessary, whatever it costs in taxes, to see 
that everyone gets the medical they need.”210  Of course, significant 
areas of disagreement remain, particularly on issues of how to pay 
for expanded coverage,211  but taken as a whole, Critical Care, The 
Rainmaker, and John Q are not on the leading edge of public opin-
ion. Instead, they appear to lag behind and become less daring in 
their solutions over time.
Overall, the “dissolving critique” of these films is a missed opportu-
nity to reflect and reinforce public opinion regarding the healthcare 
crisis and to imagine inclusive solutions. Even though personal 
transformations like that of Dr. Ernst hold promise for systemic 
change, and incremental changes like John’s rampage or the Blacks’ 
lawsuit bring relief to a few, they do not address the larger, systemic 
problems. Incremental, private, and individualistic solutions, such 
as consumer-directed health plans, appear similarly inadequate. 
Hopefully, these three films signal a new critical focus on health 
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insurance and healthcare in contemporary mainstream film that 
will reflect and reinforce public opinion rather than retreating from 
it and, therefore, spark and support discussion of more inclusive 
and systemic solutions to the worsening healthcare crisis.
V. Conclusion
It is not surprising that images of health insurance and managed 
care emerged in popular film in the late 1990s, given the intensity 
of the managed care backlash and the inherently dramatic nature of 
narratives that force us “to contemplate our physical and economic 
vulnerability, even our death.”212  Despite their factual limitations, 
these images have significant factual support: There is a link be-
tween lack of coverage and lack of access to care; reimbursement 
arrangements may distort treatment decisions, and certainly are 
believed to do so; and workers and their families are losing adequate 
health coverage. Although these films raise serious questions about 
our private health insurance and healthcare arrangements on a sys-
temic level, they ultimately retreat into individualistic and deeply 
conservative solutions. How do you protect yourself as a consumer 
in the current healthcare system? Have a doctor like Werner Ernst, 
a lawyer like Rudy Baylor, or a parent like John Archibald. Or, in 
light of the predicted shift toward consumer-directed health plans, 
simply make better choices. 
This is a missed opportunity for Hollywood, popular culture, and 
public debate. Most Americans believe in the principle of equal ac-
cess to healthcare for the rich and the poor, with the healthier and 
wealthier subsidizing the cost of care for the sicker and poorer.213  
We do not agree, however, on how to make that principle a real-
ity. Instead of exploring the difficult issues involved in making 
our principles a reality, we appear to be retreating into private and 
individualist solutions in our films and our healthcare policy. Of 
course, Critical Care, The Rainmaker, and John Q are the first three 
mainstream films to focus on health insurance and healthcare 
arrangements. They mirror our frustrations and fears about our 
healthcare system and reflect its failings, but show us how one 
person can survive the system rather than how we can try to reform 
it. Perhaps they are the beginning of a new critical focus on health 
insurance and healthcare in contemporary mainstream film that 
could use the power of the personal narrative to push beyond a 
dissolving critique and toward real solutions, in both our movies 
and our lives.
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HI_HealthCareNews2001Vol1_iss6.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter 
Harris Interactive, The Managed Care Paradox] (“The last few years have seen a 
sharp increase in public hostility toward the health insurance and managed 
care industries.”); Havighurst, supra note 4, at 398. 
 63 Harris Interactive, Some Good News for the Industry? HEALTH CARE NEWS, July 
12, 2002, at 3, at www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/healthnews/ 
HI_HealthCareNews2002Vol2_Iss15.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter 
Harris Interactive, Some Good News]; see THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER 
PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE: THE PUBLIC MANAGED CARE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTIONS (2001), 
available at www.kff.org/insurance/3177-index.cfm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) 
[hereinafter THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE]. 
 64 Harris Interactive, Some Good News, supra note 63, at 1. 
 65 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY ON CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH 
HEALTH PLANS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CHART PACK (2000) (people report similar 
levels of stress for dealing with their health insurance company as for doing 
their taxes), available at www.kff.org/insurance/3025-index.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY ON 
CONSUMER EXPERIENCES].
 66 See Harris Interactive, While Managed Care Is Still Unpopular, Hostility has 
Declined, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Oct. 21, 2002, at 1, at www.harrisinteractive.
com/news/newsletters/healthnews/HI_HealthCareNews2002Vol2_Iss20.
pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); Harris Interactive, Some Good News, supra note 
63, at 1; Harris Interactive, More Evidence that Backlash Against Managed Care 
has Bottomed Out; Image May Be Improving Slightly, HEALTH CARE NEWS, July 30, 
2001, at 1, at www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/healthnews/ 
HI_HealthCareNews2001Vol1_iss23.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 67 HUMPHREY TAYLOR, THE HARRIS POLL #19: ATTITUDES TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
VARY GREATLY FOR DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES (2003), at www.harrisinteractive.com/ 
harris_poll/index.asp?PID=367 (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 68 See Harris Interactive, Survey on Trust in Different Industries Finds Reasonably High Trust 
in Pharmaceuticals, Less Trust in Biotech and High Distrust of Health Insurance and 
Managed Care, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Sept. 18, 2001, at 1, at www.harrisinteractive.com/ 
news/newsletters/healthnews/HI_HealthCareNews2001Vol1_iss26.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2004).
 69 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE, supra note 63. 
 70 Id.
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 71 Kenneth E. Thorpe, Managed Care As Victim or Villain? 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y 
& L. 949, 953-54 (1999) (“nearly three-quarters of Americans believe that the 
savings generated by managed care, using tools that the public often objects 
to, are retained by the health plans”).
 72 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY ON CONSUMER EXPERIENCES, 
supra note 65 (poll results “sugges[t] that the types of issues discussed in the 
patients’ rights debate are grounded in actual patient experiences, not just in 
anecdotes”). See Harris Interactive, Why Public Opinion on Health Care Issues 
Changes, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Dec. 12, 2001 at 1-3, at www.harrisinteractive.
com/news/newsletters/healthnews/HI_HealthCareNews2001Vol1_iss33.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (important factors effecting consumer opinion of 
healthcare issues include: personal experiences, media coverage, advertising 
and advocacy campaigns, events, physicians, election campaigns, costs, the 
aging of the population, and the gap between expectations and reality); 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE HEALTH BENEFITS DATABOOK, supra note 55, at 29 
(“Thirty percent of Americans form their opinions about managed care based 
on their own personal experiences, 23% percent rely on what they learn from 
family and friends, and 20% rely on what they hear or see in the media.”). But 
see Harris Interactive, Most People Continue to Think Well of Their Health Plans, 
HEALTH CARE NEWS, Feb. 5, 2002, at 2, at www.harrisinteractive.com/news/ 
newsletters/healthnews/HI_HealthCareNews2002Vol2_Iss03.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Harris Interactive, Most People Continue to Think] 
(“The personal experiences of the public with their own health plans are not 
nearly as bad as their beliefs about health insurance and managed care, which 
in many cases come from what they see on TV, in movies, or in magazines and 
newspapers.”); Harris Interactive, The Managed Care Paradox, supra note 62, at 
1-2 (“We believe that these deteriorating public perceptions of managed care 
are due to fears that are media-driven or physician-driven, and not experience-
driven. Managed care ‘horror stories’ and word-of-mouth reports may also play 
a role in creating misperceptions among consumers.”). 
 73 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY ON CONSUMER EXPERIENCES, supra 
note 65. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE, supra 
note 63. 
 74 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY ON CONSUMER EXPERIENCES, supra 
note 65. See J. BRIDGET SHEEHAN-WATANABE, HEALTH RIGHTS HOTLINE WHEN WHAT’S 
AILING YOU ISN’T ONLY YOUR HEALTH, ii-iv (2000) (report on consumer experiences in 
four California counties from 1997-99 showed that consumers with conditions 
such as cancer, diabetes, injuries, mental health conditions, musculoskeletal 
conditions, neurological conditions, and respiratory conditions dispropor-
tionately experience problems accessing care), available at www.hrh.org/ 
reports/hrh2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 75 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY ON CONSUMER EXPERIENCES, supra 
note 65.
 76 Harris Interactive, Most People Continue to Think, supra note 72, at 2; Harris 
Interactive, The Managed Care Paradox, supra note 62, at 1-2. 
 77 See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE, supra note 63 
(“at least three out of four Americans supporting such laws over time”); Harris 
Interactive, Attitudes Toward the United States’ Health Care System: Long-Term 
Trends, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Aug. 21, 2002, at 1, at www.harrisinteractive.com/
news/newsletters/healthnews/HI_HealthCareNews2002Vol2_Iss17.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Attitudes Toward the United States’ Health 
Care System] (describing a 2002 poll showing that the prior-documented gaps 
between the views of the public, physicians, employers, hospital managers, 
and health plan managers have narrowed, with the level of support for “radical 
change” similar across these groups). See also TAYLOR, supra note 67 (reporting 
that in a 2002 poll, the two industries most often characterized as needing more 
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regulation were the managed care industry and the health insurance industry, 
again ranking just below oil and tobacco industries).
 78 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2002 HEALTH CONFIDENCE SURVEY (2002), avail-
able at www.ebri.org/hcs/2002 (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
 79 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND, Health Security Watch, in KAISER HEALTH POLL REPORT 
(Jan./Feb. 2004 ed.) available at www.kff.org/healthpollreport/currentedition/ 
security/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). See Press Release, Harris Interactive, 
Latest National Poll Says Health Care Issues May Influence 40% of Votes in 
Tuesday’s Congressional Election (Nov. 4, 2002), at www.harrisinteractive.
com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=540 (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (prior 
to the November 2002 elections, 40% of voters reported that healthcare issues 
could influence the their votes, with the two most important issues being the 
expansion of health insurance to lower the number of uninsured, and the total 
cost of healthcare).
 80 Attitudes Toward the United States’ Health Care System, supra note 77 (a stronger 
consensus for reform among the various players in the debate appears to be 
building, as a 2002 poll showed that the prior-documented gaps between the 
views of the public, physicians, employers, hospital managers, and health plan 
managers have narrowed, with the level of support for “radical change” similar 
across these groups).
 81 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE, supra note 63 
(“Concern about managed care and support for consumer protection proposals 
remain strong, yet arguments about potential costs and consequences of re-
forms also continued to resonate with the public.”).
 82 Michael Asimow, Introduction to Papers from UCLA’s Law and Popular Culture 
Seminar, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 87, 87 (2001). See Paul Joseph, Law and Popular 
Culture, 24 NOVA L. REV. 527, 527 (2000). 
 83 For example, notwithstanding critical reviews, John Q was ranked number 
one over the weekend of its release and took in $23.6 million, a record for a 
President’s Day release. Amy Snow Landa, John Q Desperate: Hollywood Takes on 
Health Insurance, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, at 1, available at www.ama-assn.
org/amednews/2002/03/04gvl20304.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). More 
than 15 million people saw John Q, and it had a “ripple effect” throughout the 
public: while only 6% actually saw it, more than 44% said they had heard of it. 
Press Release, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., John Q Goes to Washington: 
Health Policy Issues in Popular Culture (July 16, 2002), available at www.kff.
org/entmedia/20020716a-index.cfm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). See Deborah 
A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 
11, 32 (1999-2000) (“The publicity about coverage denials, deaths, suits and 
plaintiffs’ victories stirs public outrage and fuels activist mobilization. Popular 
culture can vastly amplify widespread media coverage of insurance coverage 
controversies.” (referring to film version of The Rainmaker)).
 84 See President Bill Clinton, supra note 6 (discussing the subject of Patient’s Bill 
of Rights); Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Statement at the Boston Forum on the 
Patient’s Bill of Rights (July 20, 1998), available at www.senate.gov/~kennedy/
statements/980720.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); Donna E. Shalala, Secretary 
of Heath and Human Services, Address at the Mayo Clinic Medical School Com-
mencement (May 16, 1998), available at www.hhs.gov/news/speeches/980516.
html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
 85 “The day before [John Q] opened, the American Ass[ociation] of Health Plans 
began running full-page ads in Washington, D.C., and Hollywood newspapers 
declaring that ‘the fictional character John Q. has the wrong answer for America’s 
health care cost crisis.’” Landa, supra note 83 (noting that the film “struck a raw 
nerve with managed care executives, who learned four years ago with the release 
of ‘As Good as It Gets’ that slamming their industry can play very well with 
moviegoers”); Press Release, America’s Health Insurance Plans, AAHP’s ‘John 
Q’ Ad Shines Spotlight on Growing Uninsured Crisis (Feb. 14, 2002) available 
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at tinyurl.com/3xkm8 (last visited May 5, 2004) [herinafter AAHP’s ‘John Q’ 
Ad] (quoting American Association of Health Plans President and CEO Karen 
Ignagni, “[t]he real villain in this story is rising health care costs, and the terrible 
toll exacted on millions of Americans who have been priced out of the health 
care system. It is time to take a hard look at the runaway litigation system and 
excessive government regulations that have needlessly helped drive health 
care affordability out of reach for so many Americans.”).
 86 A survey conducted by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation found that most 
people believe that the refusal of coverage in John Q was an accurate reflection of 
reality. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., RESPONSE TO THE MOVIE JOHN Q 1 (2002), 
at www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/John_Q_Survey_ 
Snapshot.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (reporting that 42% say they think 
health insurers refuse to pay for treatments like those in the movie “a lot;” 30%, 
“sometimes;” 9%, “rarely;” and 2%, “never”).
 87 CRITICAL CARE, supra note 8. Of course, as noted above, Dr. Butz is portrayed as an 
incompetent buffoon, and the last scene, in which Dr. Ernst does not hesitate 
to care for the “rowdy” young rollerblader, undercuts Butz’s view. Nonetheless, 
much of the action in the film bears out Butz’s descriptions. See id. 
 88 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 1 
(2002), at www.iom.edu/includes/dbfile.asp?id=4160 (last visited Mar. 29, 
2004); AM. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, NO HEALTH INSURANCE? IT’S ENOUGH TO MAKE YOU 
SICK: SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LINKING THE LACK OF HEALTH COVERAGE TO POOR HEALTH 4 
(2000), at www.acponline.org/uninsured/lack-paper.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 
2004) (summarizing research over a ten-year period).
 89 Diane Rowland, Executive Director, The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured, Low-Income and Uninsured: The Challenge for Extending Coverage: 
Hearing on “Living Without Insurance: Who’s Uninsured and Why?” Statements 
Before the Senate Committee on Finance (Sept. 10, 2001), available at www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=13755 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004); See also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COVERAGE MATTERS: 
INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE 2, at www.iom.edu/report.asp?id=4662 (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2004).
 90 JOHN BUDETTI ET. AL, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, CAN’T AFFORD TO GET SICK: A REALITY FOR 
MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS: THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
WORKERS’ HEALTH INSURANCE 6 (1999), at www.abtassoc.com/reports/commfund.
pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). See also Rowland, supra note 89, at 10.
 91 Rowland, supra note 89, at 10. The uninsured are twice as likely to experience 
delay in getting needed medical care as people with insurance. BRADLEY C. STRUNK 
& PETER J. CUNNINGHAM, TREADING WATER: AMERICANS’ ACCESS TO NEEDED MEDICAL 
CARE, 1997-2001, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE TRACKING REP., (Mar. 
2002) at 2, at www.hschange.org/CONTENT/421/421.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 
2004) (“15.7 percent vs. 8.6 percent”). Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Uninsured and Their Access 
to Health Care, Key Facts, Jan. 2003 at 2 [hereinafter The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Found., The Uninsured and Their Access to Health Care] (“In 2002, over 40% of 
uninsured adults postponed seeking medical care, and 28% say they needed 
but did not get medical care in the past year.”).
 92 STRUNK & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 91, at 1 (15% versus 4.4%).
 93 See AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 88, at 7, 16 & 18 (summarizing results of 
studies of children and adolescents); The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The 
Uninsured and Their Access to Health Care, supra note 91, at 2. 
 94 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Uninsured and Their Access to Health Care, 
supra note 91, at 2.
 95 Id.
 96 ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, COVERING HEALTH ISSUES: CAMPAIGN 2000 & BEYOND 
(2000). See INSTITUTE. OF MEDICINE, supra note 88, at 2 (the uninsured are more 
likely to die during or immediately after a hospitalization for a heart attack).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=578321
Journal of Health Law – Volume 37, No. 2
Missed
Opportunity
304
Health Insurance
 97 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 88, at 3. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., 
The Uninsured and Their Access to Health Care, supra note 91, at 2 (“Death rates 
for uninsured women with breast cancer are significantly higher compared to 
women with insurance.”).
 98 JOHN Q, supra note 10. 
 99 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2004). 
 100 See Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1189 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605). 
EMTALA applies to hospitals, not to physicians. A physician’s duty of care is 
defined by state law, which traditionally includes a duty of continuous care 
to an established patient. See, e.g., 61 Am. Jur. 2D Physicians, Surgeons and Other 
Healers § 216 (2003) (“The relation of physician and patient continues until 
it is ended by the consent of the parties . . . or until his services are no longer 
needed, and until then the physician is under a duty to continue to provide 
necessary medical care to the patient.”).
 101 “Emergency medical condition” is defined as 
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of suffi-
cient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate 
medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in—
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a preg-
nant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in 
serious jeopardy, 
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions—
 (i)  that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another 
hospital before delivery, or
 (ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the 
woman or the unborn child.
 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (2004). “Stabilized” is defined as “no material dete-
rioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to 
result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility, or, with 
respect to [a pregnant woman who is having contractions], that the woman 
has delivered (including the placenta).” Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B).
 102 Id. § 1395dd(b)(1). 
 103 See Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 350 (4th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting appellant’s argument that EMTALA requires continuous 
stabilization, “no matter how long treatment [is] required to maintain that 
condition”). 
 104 COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT 
COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 73 (2002) (summarizing research on impact 
of uninsured status on emergency and trauma care). See Peter Jackson, The 
Impact of Health Insurance Status on Emergency Room Services, 14 J. OF HEALTH & 
SOC. POL’Y 61, 72 (2001) (finding that those without insurance receive less care 
in the emergency room than similarly diagnosed people with private insur-
ance); David W. Baker et al., Health Insurance and Access to Care for Symptomatic 
Conditions, 160 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1269 (2000) (“Lack of health insur-
ance is a major barrier to receiving medical care, even for highly serious and 
morbid symptoms.”).
 105 Rowland, supra note 89, at 11. (“Among families with at least one uninsured 
member, only a quarter report they have received this kind of charity in the 
past year.”).
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 106 Id. at 10 (“When the uninsured are unable to pay the full medical bill in cash 
at the time of service, they either pay with credit cards (typically with high 
interest rates) or negotiate a payment schedule with the clinic or hospital. In 
the case of hospital bills, the debt may take years to repay.”). 
 107 Id. at 12; COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HEALTH 
INSURANCE IS A FAMILY MATTER 87 (2002) (because “[u]ninsured families are more 
likely to face high medical bills with less income, savings, and other assets than 
are insured families,” they may struggle with routine medical bills and/or be 
overwhelmed by a major hospitalization or chronic illness). Even families with 
some form of insurance often experience medical bills that far exceed their 
coverage or ability to pay. See Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates 
Over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 375, 377 (2001) (about 80% of the more than half-million middle-class 
families that turned to bankruptcy courts for help after illness or injury in 
1999 had some form of medical insurance); MARK MERLIS, THE COMMONWEALTH 
FUND, FAMILY OUT-OF-POCKET SPENDING FOR HEALTH SERVICES: A CONTINUING SOURCE 
OF FINANCIAL INSECURITY VII (2002), at www.cmwf.org/programs/insurance/ 
merlis_oopspending_509.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
 108 See Julie Ishida, Uninsured Pay More for Prescription Drugs, Report Says, WASH. 
POST, July 16, 2003, at A02 (according to study by U.S. Public Interest Research 
Group, uninsured Americans pay 72% more on average that the federal gov-
ernment for prescription drugs); Lucette Lagnado, Hospitals Urged to End Harsh 
Tactics for Billing Uninsured, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2003, at A9; Sara B. Miller, Probing 
Disparity in Healthcare Bills, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 19, 2003, at A9 
(noting that although hospitals are required to disclose official “list prices” for 
services, insurers are often able to negotiate lower prices while the uninsured 
are charged the full amount).
 109 See CRITICAL CARE, supra note 8.
 110 Id.
 111 John Q also illustrates the consequences of precertification requirements. 
Instead of performing the surgery and then seeking reimbursement, the 
hospital was (presumably) required to obtain authorization from John’s insurer 
prior to performing the surgery. When the hospital learned that the insurer 
would not cover the surgery, it declined to perform the surgery without a down 
payment. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2 (defining precertification).
 112 JOHN Q, supra note 10.
 113 See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective 
Institutions, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 931, 931-32 (1999) (discussing studies); 
Enthoven, supra note 54, at 2 (noting that “large amounts of inappropriate 
surgery and hospital admissions” were among the problems with fee-for-service 
health insurance, citing W.C. (BILL) WILLIAMS, III, M.D. ET AL., THE AM. COLL. OF 
MANAGED CARE MED. AND THE NAT’L ASS’N OF MANAGED CARE PHYSICIANS, PAVING THE 
PATHWAY TO MANAGED CARE MEDICINE 3 (2000)). See also David Hemenway et al., 
Physicians’ Responses to Financial Incentive:Evidence from a For-Profit Ambulatory 
Care Center, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1059 (1990) (individual, performance-based 
financial incentives based on individual performance may induce a group of 
physicians to increase the intensity of their practice); Douglas A. Conrad et al., 
The Impact of Financial Incentives on Physicians Productivity in Medical Groups, 37 
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 885, 885 (2002) (individual financial incentives do increase 
individual physician productivity).
 114 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
 115 But see MARC RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS: PHYSICIAN’S CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
55-134 (1993) (analyzing financial arrangements developed as alternatives to 
fee-for-service that also create a conflict of interest, and specifically an incen-
tive to increase services). Moreover, the abuses noted under the fee-for-service 
arrangement in private health insurance remain an issue for Medicare. See Gina 
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Kolata, Patients in Florida Lining Up for All that Medicare Covers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2003, at A1. 
 116 See, e.g., RODWIN, supra note 115, at 135-75 (analyzing financial incentives to 
decrease services in HMOs and hospitals); Timothy S. Hall, Bargaining with 
Hippocrates: Managed Care and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 54 S.C. L. REV. 
689, 694-97 (2003).
 117 RODWIN, supra note 115, at 145 (“There is little hard data concerning the effects 
of financial incentives on physicians’ clinical decisions.”).
 118 Id. at 145 (discussing Alan L. Hillman, M.D. et al., How Do Financial Incentives 
Affect Physicians’ Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health 
Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989)). 
 119 See Kevin Grumbach et al., Primary Care Physicians’ Experience of Financial 
Incentives in Managed Care Settings, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1516 (1998) 
(finding, among other things, that “[i]ncentives that depend on limiting 
referrals or on greater productivity apply selective pressure to physicians in 
ways that are believed to compromise care”). See also T. Godsen et al., How 
Should We Pay Doctors? A Systematic Review of Salary Payments and Their Effect 
on Doctor Behaviour, 92 Q.J. MED. 47, 47 (1999) (review of literature on influ-
ence of salaries payment on doctor behavior in UK finding that “payment by 
salaries is associated with lowest use of tests, . . . and referrals” as well as lower 
number of procedures per patient, lower number of patients per doctor, longer 
consultations, more preventative care and different patterns of consultation 
as compared to fee-for-service payment). A 1994 study published in the Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association, however, concluded that there was no 
statistical significant relationship between the method of compensation of 
a group of 865 primary care physicians in Washington and the use and cost 
of care. Douglas Conrad et al., Primary Care Physician Compensation Method in 
Medical Groups: Does It Influence the Use and Cost of Health Services for Enrollees 
in Managed Care Organizations? 279 J.A.M.A. 853 (1998).
 120 Matthew K. Wynia et al., Do Physicians Not Offer Useful Services Because of Coverage 
Restrictions?, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 190 (2003).
 121 See id. at 191-94 (study notes that there could be several reasons for withhold-
ing the information, such as concern about raising expectations, having to 
explain coverage decisions, or being asked to falsify a claim in order to secure 
coverage).
 122 See G. Caleb Alexander et al., Support for Physician Deception of Insurance Com-
panies Among a Sample of Philadelphia Residents, 138 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 472 
(2003) (“Participants were asked whether, in response to restriction of health 
care, a physician should (1) accept restriction, (2) appeal restriction, or (3) mis-
represent a patient’s condition to obtain the desired service;” results showed 
that 26% of the respondents approved of option (3), physician misrepresenta-
tion.); Rachel M. Werner et al., The “Hassle Factor”: What Motivates Physicians 
to Manipulate Reimbursement Rules?, 162 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1134 (2002) 
(finding that physicians more likely to sanction misrepresentation of clinical 
information to secure insurance coverage for patients “when appeals process is 
longer, the likelihood of a successful appeal is lower, and the health condition 
is more severe”); Matthew K. Wynia et al., Physician Manipulation of Reimburse-
ment Rules for Patients: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 283 J.A.M.A. 1858 (2000) 
(“A sizable minority of physicians report manipulating reimbursement rules” 
by “(1) exaggerating the severity of patients’ conditions; (2) changing patients’ 
billing diagnosis; and/or (3) reporting signs or symptoms that patients did 
not have to help the patients secure coverage for needed care.”); Victor G. 
Freeman et al., Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of Third-Party Payers, 159 
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2263 (1999) (finding that many physicians report 
willingness to use deception to secure insurance coverage for needed care); 
Dennis H. Novack et al., Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Using Deception to Resolve 
Difficult Ethical Problems, 261 J.A.M.A. 2980 (1989) (noting that a majority of 
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physicians polled “indicated a willingness to misrepresent a screening test as 
a diagnostic test to secure an insurance payment”).
 123 See RODWIN, supra note 115, at 145 (discussing beliefs of managed care execu-
tives and citing Alan L. Hillman et al., HMO Managers Views on Financial Incen-
tives and Quality, 10 HEALTH AFFS. 207 (1991)); Steven D. Pearson et al., Ethical 
Guidelines for Physician Compensation Based on Capitation, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
689, 689 (1998) (noting that “managed care has triggered fears that necessary 
health services are being withheld and that decisions about health care are 
being driven by the financial bottom line”). See also Hall, supra note 116, at 
699-717 (discussing legal challenges to physician incentives under ERISA).
 124 See Bush v. Dake, No. 96-25767 NM-2 (Mich. Cir. Ct, County of Saginaw 1989). A 
claim that HMO’s reimbursement system that rewarded physicians for limiting 
medical care was an inherent or anticipatory breach of fiduciary duty under 
ERISA was rejected by the Supreme Court in 2000. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 
U.S. 211, 214 (2000).
 125 Pearson et al., supra note 123, at 689. See also Jerome P. Kassirer, Managed Care and 
the Morality of the Marketplace, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50 (1995); Alan L. Hillman, 
Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1743 (1987) (survey of physicians suggests that “[c]ertain 
financial incentives, especially when used in combination, suggest conflicts 
of interests that may influence physicians’ behavior and adversely affect the 
quality of care”).
 126 The Black’s policy in The Rainmaker is an individual policy—a representative of 
Great Benefits sold it directly to the Black family. The nature of the insurance 
policies in Critical Care is not discussed. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2, at 32-35 
(comparing group health benefits with individual health insurance).
 127 Cathy Schoen & Karen Davis, Issue Brief: Erosion of Employer-Sponsored Health 
Insurance Coverage and Quality, at www.cmwf.org/programs/insurance/
schoen_erosion_ib_297.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). See also Nat’l Bureau of 
Economic Research, Health Insurance Coverage, at www.nber.org/aginghealth/
fall02/healthInsurance1.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (“The 1980s and 
1990s were marked by two concurrent trends in employer-provided health 
insurance: a significant decrease in the fraction of workers receiving insurance 
through their employers and a sharp increase in the insurance premiums paid 
by workers.”).
 128 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2001, at www.census.gov/hhes/
hlthins/hlthin01/hlth01asc.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); RUSSELL C. COILE, 
JR., FUTURESCAN, A FORECAST OF HEALTHCARE TRENDS 2002-2006 11 (2002) (“Employer-
sponsored health insurance covers approximately 165 million, or 65 percent 
of working Americans.”). 
 129 See, e.g., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2001 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra 
note 55, at 42-43. See also Rowland, supra note 89, at i (55% of low-wage workers, 
making $7 per hour or less, are not offered coverage on the job). Part-time 
workers are less likely to be eligible for health insurance benefits than full-
time workers. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, HEALTH BENEFITS DATABOOK, 
supra note 55, at 84. 
 130 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2001 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 55, 
at 42. 
 131 Schoen & Davis, supra note 127. See CATHERINE HOFFMAN & MARIE WANG, THE KAISER 
COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA: 
2001 DATA UPDATE 4 (2003) ( majority of the uninsured come from families with 
at least one full time worker); ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., GOING WITHOUT 
HEALTH INSURANCE, at www.covertheuninsuredweek.org/media/GoingWithout 
Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (70.7% of people without insurance 
during 2001-02 were employed); Rowland, supra note 89, at 3 (“Most of the 
uninsured (71%) come from families where at least one person works full-time 
outside the home and another 12 percent come from families with part-time 
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employment.”); Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics 
of the Uninsured: Analysis of the Mar. 1999 Current Population Survey, Employee 
Benefit Research Institute, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF NO. 217, 
at www.ebri.org/ibex/ib217.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
 132 See Philip F. Cooper & Barbara Steinberg Schone, More Offers, Fewer Takers for 
Employment-Based Health Insurance: 1987 and 1996, 16 HEALTH AFFS. 142 (1997); 
Employee Benefit Research Institute, Increase in Uninsured is Due to Erosion of 
Employment-Based Health Benefits (Nov. 25, 2002), at www.ebri.org/prrel/pr614.
htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (“In 2001, 62.6% of Americans were covered 
by employment-based Health Care benefits, down from 63.6% in 2000.”).
 133 See, e.g., Iglehart, supra note 56, at 960. For example, less-restrictive PPOs are 
currently the most common type of employer-sponsored health plan, covering 
over half of employees with employer-sponsored health benefits in 2002. 
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2002 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 60, 
at 69.
 134 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2002 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 
60, at 12-13 (rates rose by 12.7% in 2002—the largest increased since 1990); 
Bradley C. Strunk et al., Tracking Health Care Costs: Growth Accelerates Again 
in 2001, HEALTH AFFS. WEB EXCLUSIVE, (Sept. 25, 2002), at content.healthaffairs.
org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.266v1.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2003) (“Premiums 
for employment-based insurance increased 12.7 percent from 2001 to 2002. 
This was the largest increase in premiums since 1990 and the sixth consecutive 
year of accelerating premium increases.”).
 135 See Hewitt Associates, Health Care Costs Continue Double-Digit Pace, But May Start 
Moderating in 2004, at was4.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom/pressrel/ 
2003/10-13-03_hc.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (forecasting average rate 
increases of 13.5% for 2004); AON CONSULTING CORP., supra note 56 (forecasting 
average health plan with prescription drug coverage rate increases of 15.7% 
to 17.2% for 2004). 
 136 Average employee contributions for health insurance benefits rose 7.5% 
in 2001, 10.8% in 2002, and are expected to rise up to 24.2% over 2003. See 
Harris Interactive, As Corporate Concerns About Health Care Costs Continue 
to Rise, Many Employers Plan to Shift More Costs to Their Employees, HEALTH 
CARE NEWS, Oct. 9, 2001, at 1-2 (Humphrey Taylor & Robert Leitman eds.), 
available at www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/healthnews/
HI_HealthCareNews2001Vol1_iss29.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); WATSON 
WYATT WORLDWIDE, CREATING A SUSTAINABLE HEALTH CARE PROGRAM: EIGHTH ANNUAL 
WASHINGTON BUSINESS GROUP ON HEALTH / WATSON WYATT SURVEY REPORT 4, at www.
watsonwyatt.com/research/resrender.asp?id=W-640&page=1 (last visited Mar. 
29, 2004).
 137 See, e.g., Rowland, supra note 89, at i (“Although most workers participate in 
employer health plans when offered, affordability is a major issue. On aver-
age, employees contribute 26 percent of premium costs ($1,656 in 2000). 
For a full-time worker earning $7 per hour, the employee share of premiums 
represents over 10 percent of the family’s annual $14,500 income.”); Alliance 
for Health Reform, Covering Health Issues: A Sourcebook for Journalists, at 
www.allhealth.org/sourcebook2002/index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) 
(noting that of those workers who are offered insurance but decline, 67% do 
so because they cannot afford their share of the premium); Cooper & Schone, 
supra note 132, at 142 (“Rising premiums may discourage firms from offering 
insurance, and higher employee contribution rates may cause some workers 
to decline coverage when it is offered.”).
 138 Iglehart, supra note 56, at 958-60 (describing trends toward increased cost-sharing 
and tiered benefits); Carol Hymowitz, Benefits: I’ll Have What He’s Having, WALL 
ST. J., May 20, 2003, at B1. Chad Terhune, Thin Cushion: Fast-Growing Health 
Plan Has a Catch: $1,000-a-Year Cap, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at A1; Angela 
Galloway, Insurance Proposals Aim at Small-Business Coverage Treatment Mandates 
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Would Be Affected; Goal Is To Offer ‘Bare Bones’ Plans, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
Feb. 21, 2003, at A1 (discussing Washington state’s proposal bill allowing small 
businesses to offer “bare bones” health insurance coverage, to exempt or charge 
more to certain employees, and to exempt them from specifically mandated 
services such as mental health and mammograms).
 139 See Daniel Costello, Firms Cut Back Medical Coverage: Faced With Soaring Costs, 
Many Employers Are Discouraging Workers From Adding Spouses or Children to 
Their Insurance Plans, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at F1.
 140 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits employment 
practices that “discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin,” including discrimi-
nation in employment benefits such as health insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(1) (2004); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 
669, 670 (1983). In 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amended 
Title VII to clarify that discrimination “because of sex” included discrimina-
tion “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA requires that “women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same 
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability 
or inability to work. Id.
 141 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits individuals over 
forty years of age from discrimination based on age with respect to any term, 
condition, or privilege of employment, including health insurance benefits. 
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2004). The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 
(OWBPA) amended the ADEA to specifically prohibit employers from denying 
benefits to older employees. An employer may reduce benefits based on age 
only if the cost of providing the reduced benefits to older workers is the same 
as the cost of providing benefits to younger workers. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) 
(2004).
 142 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits, among other 
things, an employer from discriminating on the basis of disability against a 
qualified individual with a disability in regard to health insurance benefits. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2004); 29 C.F.R § 1630.4(f) (2004). There have been, 
however, reports in the press that employers are terminating disabled workers 
in order to control the cost of health- and life-insurance benefits. Joseph Pereira, 
Parting Shot: To Save on Health-Care Costs, Firms Fire Disabled Workers, WALL ST. 
J., July 14, 2003, at A1.
 143 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2004).
 144 Id. § 1140.
 145 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2002 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 60, 
at 32; WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, supra note 136 (in 2002, 33% of employers 
reported that they planned to reduce or eliminate coverage).
 146 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2002 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 60, 
at 106 (on average, 17% of covered workers in firms report that they offered 
employees a lower level of health benefits than in 2001).
 147 “Underinsured” is generally understood as having coverage that is inadequate, 
either because it includes high co-payments and deductibles or because impor-
tant costs are not covered. See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Forum for State Health Policy Leadership, Frequently Asked Questions: Access 
and the Uninsured, at 13, at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/faqaccess.
htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 148 Terhune, supra note 138. Although such plans make health insurance afford-
able for some workers; they do so by greatly increasing the deductible and/or 
reducing benefits, creating an obvious risk for any worker who becomes injured 
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or ill. See Sherry Glied et al., Bare Bones Health Plans: Are They Worth The Money?, 
in THE COMMONWEALTH FUND ISSUE BRIEF 1, 1-2 (May, 2002).
 149 See generally TOWERS PERRIN, KEEPING EMPLOYEES ENGAGED ABOUT HEALTH CARE 
(2003).
 150 Id.
 151 Marie Cocco, Health Care Puts Everyone on the Picket Line, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 2003, 
at A33.
 152 Id.
 153 David Stires, Health Costs: The Breaking Point; Worker Health Costs Will Rise a 
Staggering 24% this year. Companies Can No Longer Afford to Pick Up the Bill. The 
Battle Is Here, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003, at 104.
 154 Based on the depiction of John’s workplace, COBRA would apply because the 
factory appears to have more than twenty employees. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(b) 
(2003). Termination (for reasons other than misconduct) and reduction in 
hours that result in the loss of coverage for the employee or a covered benefi-
ciary are defined as “qualifying events” that trigger continuation coverage. Id. 
§ 1163 (“qualifying events” include the death of the employee; termination 
(for reasons other than gross misconduct) or reduction in hours; divorce or 
legal separation; the employee’s entitlement to Medicare; dependent child’s 
loss of dependent status; and employer bankruptcy). If the qualifying event of 
termination or reduction in hours occurs, continuation coverage is available 
for 18 months. Id.§ 1162(2)(A)(i).
 155 Id. § 1162(4) (“[t]he coverage may not be conditioned upon, or discriminate 
on the basis of lack of, evidence of insurability”).
 156 Id.§ 1162(3).
 157 An individual is eligible if: he has eighteen months of continuous prior cover-
age, most recently with a group health plan, and without a gap of more than 
sixty-two days; he is not eligible for private group insurance or a public program 
such as Medicare or Medicaid and has no other source of coverage; he was not 
terminated from prior group coverage for fraud or failure to pay premiums; and 
he has exhausted any available COBRA or similar state continuation period. 
29 U.S.C. § 300gg-41(b) (2004).
 158 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-300gg-92 (2004).
 159 Id. § 300gg-42.
 160 Id. § 300gg-41(g)(1).
 161 There are no facts to suggest that Mikey was eligible for Medicare, which pro-
vides benefits to people over the age of sixty-five who have paid at least forty 
quarters of payroll taxes, people with disabilities who have received Social 
Security Disability Income Benefits, and people with end-stage renal disease. 
42 USCA § 1395 (2003). See generally Ctrs. for Medicaid and Medicare Services, 
Medicare Information Resource, at www.cms.hhs.gov/medicare/ (last visited Mar. 
29, 2004).
 162 Medicaid is a program funded jointly by the federal and state governments 
that provides health insurance benefits for a broad range of basic health ser-
vices to the poorest and most vulnerable Americans. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE (Jan. 2004), available at www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=30463 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004). To qualify for Medicaid, an individual must meet 
financial criteria and be a member of one of the eligible categories, including 
low-income children, pregnant women, the elderly, people with total and 
permanent disabilities, and some parents. See generally Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, Medicaid Site for Consumer Information, at www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
medicaid/consumer.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). Coverage can vary from 
state to state, as states have discretion to cover individuals beyond the feder-
ally mandated minimum coverage requirements. Id. According to the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid covered 24 million children, 
10 million adults, 5 million seniors, and 8 million people with disabilities in 
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2002. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM: TWO DECADES OF CHANGE, 1980-2003 (Oct. 2003), available at www.cms.
hhs.gov/charts/healthcaresystem/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
 163 The Archibald’s family income is John’s income of $18,200 (although it is 
unclear whether that represents his salary at full-time employment or at his 
reduced, part-time hours), plus some additional income from his wife’s job as 
a grocery-store clerk. JOHN Q, supra note 10.
 164 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., State Health Facts Online, Income Eligibility 
Levels of Children Under Medicaid as a Percent of Federal Poverty Level (Apr. 2003), 
available at www.statehealthfacts.org (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 165 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 
ENROLLING UNINSURED LOW-INCOME CHILDREN IN MEDICAID AND CHIP, KEY FACTS (May 
2002), available at www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/ 
security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14045 (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
 166 The State of Illinois recently raised the eligibility level for the KidCare program 
to 200% of the federal poverty level or $30,516 for a family of three. See Press 
Release, Office of the Governor of the State of Illinois, Governor Signs Legislation 
Expanding KidCare and FamilyCare: Health Care Coverage for 20,000 More Children 
and 300,000 More Working Parents (July 1, 2003), available at tinyurl.com/yuuuq 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 167 Illinois Dep’t. of Public Aid, Bureau of Kidcare, at www.dpaillinois.com/programs/ 
kidcare.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 168 Asimow, supra note 82.
 169 Paul Joseph, supra note 82. See JOSEPH TUROW & RACHEL GANS, THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUNDATION, AS SEEN ON TV: HEALTH POLICY ISSUES IN TV’S MEDICAL DRAMAS 1 
(July 2002), at www.kff.org/entmedia/John_Q_Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 
2004) (“[r]esearchers have long recognized that new media coverage affects 
what the general public believes about health care”).
 170 Indeed, the health insurance industry was quick to point out inaccuracies in 
John Q’s depiction of coverage for heart transplantation. See US Newswire, Blue 
Cross Blue Shield Warns: “John Q” Probably Not Blue; Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Offers Premier Transplant Network (Feb. 11, 2002), available at www.usnewswire.
com/topnews/temp/0211-126.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (describing 
the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association’s Blue Quality Centers for Trans-
plant and quoting Dr. Allan Korn, chief medical officer of BCBSA, “[w]hat the 
movie-going public needs to know is that state-of-the-art transplant coverage 
is readily available, and if you are uninsured or your employer doesn’t cover 
transplants, you do have other options available to you other than the violent 
means glorified in this Hollywood action film”). 
 171 Landa, supra note 83 (quoting Peter Clark, Professor, Preventative Medicine, 
Keck School of Medicine and Professor, Communication, Annenberg School 
for Communication, University of Southern California).
 172 Interestingly, the reference to “government sponsored health care” in Great 
Benefit’s closing argument was an invention of the film. See GRISHAM, THE RAIN-
MAKER 396-97 (1995).
 173 JOHN Q, supra note 10.
 174 Id. After he takes the law into his own hands, John seems unsure of his next 
move: “I got no moves. . . . I don’t know what I’m going to do. I’m waiting on 
a miracle. I’m waiting on an act of God.” Id. 
 175 Prior to publishing Critical Care, his first novel, Richard Dooling worked as a 
respiratory therapist in intensive care units and as a lawyer. See Richard Dooling, 
at members.cox.net/dooling/bio.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). 
 176 CRITICAL CARE, supra note 8. Nurse Stella helps a suffering, terminal patient achieve 
a peaceful death in defiance of Dr. Hofsteader’s orders as well as the potentially 
legally binding “full code” order imposed by the patient’s family. Id. 
 177 The film did not otherwise focus on the child’s insurance arrangements or 
their impact on his care. Interestingly, none of the other three films enjoyed 
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the press attention or box office success of As Good As It Gets. See AS GOOD AS IT 
GETS, supra note 3. 
 178 As Donny Ray’s parents sum up the situation, “It’s simple . . . they’re a bunch 
of crooks. . . . They think we’re simple, ignorant trash with no money to 
fight’em.” THE RAINMAKER, supra note 9. See Jerry, supra note 30; Widiss, supra 
note 30 (discussing the prevalence, justification, and application of preexisting 
conditions exclusions). 
 179 JOHN Q, supra note 10. As noted above, Ms. Payne does raise the issue of cost 
when she says, “[i]t costs money to provide health care. It’s expensive for you, 
it’s expensive for us,” but this observation is never explored. Id. Interestingly, 
the American Association of Health Plans did raise the high cost of healthcare 
in connection with John Q ,but appeared to place the blame on trial lawyers 
and government regulation. See AAHP’s ‘John Q’ Ad, supra note 85 (“The real 
villain in this story is rising health costs, and the terrible toll exacted on mil-
lions of Americans who have been priced out of the health care system . . . . 
It is time to take a hard look at the runaway litigation system and excessive 
government regulations that have needlessly helped drive health care afford-
ability out of reach for so many Americans.” (quoting American Association 
of Health Plans’ President and CEO Karen Ignagni.)).
 180 See Morawetz, supra note 13 (“The health care debates show, perhaps better 
than other debates in our history, that we cannot address questions about 
insurance—what options should we have?—what arrangements should be 
compulsory?—without revisiting all of the main questions of politics: how 
much freedom should persons have? How much risk should they bear? How 
should responsibilities and rights be allocated between individuals and the 
state? How should the liberal ideal of autonomy be reconciled with egalitarian 
ideals and goals?”). See also Carol Weisbrod, Insurance and the Utopian Idea, 6 
CONN. INS. L.J. 381 (1999-2000). 
 181 Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?, 
HEALTH AFFS. WEB EXCLUSIVE (May 28, 2003), at content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/ 
reprint/hlthaff.w3.237v1.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004). The increases appear 
to be driven largely by prescription drug spending and hospital costs. Stephen 
Heffler et al., Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012, HEALTH AFFS. WEB EXCLUSIVE 
(Feb. 7, 2003), at content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.54v1.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004); Strunk et al., supra note 134.
 182 Heffler et al., supra note 181.
 183 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 128. “Uninsured” is generally defined as lacking 
health insurance, public or private, as well as the ability to pay for healthcare 
See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 89.
 184 ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 131. 
 185 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 89.
 186 See, e.g., THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMACH, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH POLICY 
192 (2002) (“The future of HMOs will be largely determined by the decision of 
big employers, whose employees make up 63 million of the 80 million enrollees 
in HMOs.”).
 187 See, e.g., Iglehart, supra note 56 at 957. As one author has noted, “[i]n some 
respects, this confluence of events recalls the early 1990s when employers 
struggled with rapidly rising premiums during an economic downturn and 
responded by aggressively shifting health benefit offerings to tightly man-
aged care.” Cara S. Lesser & Paul B. Ginsberg, Ctr. for Studying Health System 
Change, Health Care Cost and Access Problems Intensify, in Issue Brief No. 63 
(May 2003), at 2, available at www.hschange.org/CONTENT/559/ (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2004). 
 188 Several authors have predicted a shift toward consumer-driven health plans. 
See, e.g., Paul Fronstin, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Defined Contribu-
tion Health Benefits, Issue Brief, No. 231 (Mar. 2001), at 3, available at www.ebri.
org/ibex/ib231.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004); Iglehart, supra note 56, at 960; 
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John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 397, 397 (2003); Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A 
Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 365, 377-78 (2003); John V Jacobi & Nicole 
Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and Disintermediation in Managed 
Care, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 310-11 (2001). The idea of consumer-driven 
health plans is not new, but experimentation with these types of plans was 
encouraged by a 2002 Treasury Department ruling providing tax preferences 
for health reimbursement arrangements. Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-02 C.B. 75. 
Indeed, plans like these are now being offered by benefit design companies 
such as Definity Health and Synhrgy HR Technologies. See Ed Kaplan, Early 
Results Mixed for Consumer-Centric Plans, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, Feb. 3, 2003, at 
www.benefitnews.com/detail.cfm?id=4000&terms=|kaplan| (last visited Mar. 
29, 2004); SYNHRGY TECHNOLOGIES, WHITEPAPER, CONSUMER DRIVEN HEALTH (CDH) 
PLAN SHOWS POSITIVE RESULTS FOR EMPLOYER (2003), available at www.synhrgy.
com/pdf/synhrgy_cdh_casestudy.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (presenting 
results of one employer’s experience with a CDH product); Michael Taggart, 
Research Supports CDH Assumptions, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, Sept. 15, 2002 at 
12, at www.benefitnews.com/detail.cfm?id=3510&terms=|taggart| (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2004) (President of Synhrgy HR Technologies, Inc., outlining research 
and experience with Synhrgy’s consumer-driven healthcare products).
 189 See Fronstin, supra note 188, at 11-16 (outlining models of defined contribu-
tion plans). Consumer-driven plans go by many names, including defined 
contribution, DC Health, Defined Health, consumer-driven/directed health 
insurance, e-health, self-directed plans, and fixed-contribution plans.
 190 See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 188. Any shortfall between the amount of the 
employer’s defined contribution and the cost of the chosen health plan would 
be borne by the employee. Id.
 191 See, e.g., Taggart, supra note 188. See also Jacobi, supra note 188, at 404 (describ-
ing consumer-driven plans, generally). For example, based on sample figures 
provided by Definity Health, an employer could place $500 in a personal spend-
ing account to be used for an employee’s qualifying healthcare expenses. If 
the employee does not use the $500, he can roll it over into the next year. If he 
uses the $500, he is responsible for his own healthcare costs up to some speci-
fied annual deductible, such as $1,500. After he spends $1,500, the insurance 
policy begins covering eligible healthcare costs in accordance with its terms 
for the rest of that year. Kaplan, supra note 188. 
 192 See Sally Trude & Paul B. Ginsberg, Ctr. for Studying Health System Change, 
Are Defined Contributions a New Direction for Employer-Sponsored Coverage?, Issue 
Brief No. 32 (Oct. 2000), at www.hschange.org/CONTENT/273 (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2004).
 193 WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, supra note 136.
 194 Fronstin, supra note 188, at 22.
 195 Although the United States spends more on healthcare than any other country, 
it ranks below average on most measures of health services use, suggesting that 
the difference in spending is caused by higher prices, not increased utilization. 
Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States is So Different 
From Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 89, 89-90 (2003), available at content.
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